


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LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT



Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division
J-4 Directorate
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

25 February 1987

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A REPORT

LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

25 February 1987

Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division
J-4 Directorate
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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PREFACE

On 25 February 1987 the J-4 Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a seminar on logistic planning for the low intensity conflict environment. The seminar built on the initial preparations begun and discussions held at the first seminar last November. A separate report of that seminar, "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict," has been provided to the participants.

The seminar began by examining logistic problems in low intensity conflict from the viewpoint of a commander. Various initiatives to develop logistic concepts and doctrine for low intensity conflict were also discussed. In addition, the seminar also examined several logistic planning issues for the LIC environment.

The seminar group is planning to transition to a working group under the Joint Logistic Techniques and Procedures Board (JLTPB). To maintain continuity, we would like to encourage the participating organizations to use their representatives at the seminars as their representatives to the working group.

This summary of the seminar discussions is provided to assist logistic planners in developing logistic concepts, procedures, and systems to meet the challenges of low intensity conflict. OJCS/J-4 will continue to provide assistance to the joint logistic community in this endeavor. However, discussions summarized in this report do not necessarily reflect the position of any Service, agency, or department.



RICHARD L. STONER
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Plans, Concepts,
and Analysis, J-4

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LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

Overview. A seminar on logistic planning for the low intensity conflict environment was held on 25 February 1987 by the Studies, Concepts, and Analysis (SCAD) Division of OJCS/J-4. The agenda is at Appendix A.

The seminar was attended by representatives of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Service headquarters, and the logistic staffs of unified commands. Other participants included representatives of the Air Force Logistics Management Center; the U.S. Army Logistics Center; the U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict; Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education; and National Defense University. An attendance roster is at Appendix B.

Purpose. The meeting was held to examine logistic planning issues in preparing for and supporting low intensity operations; to discuss initiatives to develop logistic concepts and doctrine for application in low intensity conflict; and to continue the exchange of information on logistic projects that was begun last November with the first OJCS/J-4 seminar.

The first seminar provided an opportunity to examine logistic problems in developing and providing support capabilities in low intensity conflict (LIC). It was productive in exchanging information on current initiatives, studies, and other development efforts. A separate report of that seminar, "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict," has been provided to the participants and should be used with this report for a complete record of seminar discussions and logistic LIC projects.

Several participants requested another seminar to continue the initial preparations and discussions begun at the November meeting. This seminar was held to satisfy those requests and also to support the OJCS/J-4 goals for 1987.

Goals. The Director of Logistics (J-4), OJCS, has set several goals for 1987. Of particular importance for this report is the goal to develop logistic doctrine and concepts for application across the entire spectrum of conflict to

include low intensity conflict (see Figure 1). Sponsoring the seminar is one of several OJCS/J-4 actions being taken to support this goal. (All OJCS/J-4 goals for 1987 are listed in Appendix C.)

OJCS/J-4 GOAL

DEVELOP LOGISTIC DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS FOR APPLICATION ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT TO INCLUDE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Figure 1

The first topic addressed by the seminar was the logistic planning problems from the viewpoint of a commander.

A COMMANDER'S VIEW

Brigadier General Arnold Schlossberg, Jr., opened the seminar by discussing his perspectives on the key logistic concerns in a commander faces in the low intensity conflict environment. The discussion focused on his experiences as Commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) Alpha and JTF 11 in Honduras.

General Schlossberg, now the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, OJCS/J-5, began by reviewing the conditions of a bare-base deployment. He emphasized that logisticians in a LIC environment are in positions of high visibility and have many opportunities to use their experience and skills to counter the difficulties caused by being geographically separated from extensive U.S. logistic facilities and resources. Few situations today can be as demanding and rewarding as those where the logistician has to use innovative approaches and develop solutions to respond to problems in logistic procedures and those compounded by an insufficient logistic infrastructure in the area of operations.

Logisticians need to be forceful and need to speak the commander's language. They have to be able to explain to the commander what logistic elements should be frontloaded ahead of a task force so that the logistic support will be ready.

Logistic Support Early. The major lesson to get across to commanders is that they must take their logistic support in early. In a wartime environment, early arrival of combat elements is necessary to secure an area from which to operate; however, in a benign environment, the arrival of

logistic elements may have to precede combat forces so that logistic support for their operations will be timely and adequate. The deployment flow should include logistic elements early. Without the necessary logistic support, combat forces and other elements cannot do their jobs.

(The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (JLICP) Final Report, in the logistic section of Volume II, discusses the issue of using support elements as the lead elements to adequately prepare a LIC area of operations before combat forces are deployed. It quotes General Schlossberg: "Commanders on the ground ahead of support are basically incapable of accomplishing the mission for any period of time." It also adds, "He stated that commanders need to be convinced that the first guys they want on the ground are their support people." (See OJCS/J-4 Seminar Report, 19 November 1986, on "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict" for other findings of the JLICP Final Report and pages 10-11 of this report for actions being taken on the report's recommendations.)

Logistic Requirements. Development of the logistic base should precede -- at least coincide and be expanded with -- the arrival of troops. A logistic survey before forces are deployed is critical to determining what support is available and what support must be deployed. Items available in the host country can reduce significantly the support items that must be deployed.

The commander must have an adequate logistic staff for all in-country planning. Logistic planning done by an external staff or another headquarters may be less responsive to time-sensitive requirements and local conditions.

The logistician needs to set objectives and tell the commander what is needed. The logistician, better than anyone, knows that setting a policy -- such as providing hot meals -- is easier than making it happen. The logistician must keep the commander informed so that problems can be elevated up the chain of command until they reach the appropriate authority level to resolve them.

General Schlossberg also pointed out that it is important to let the logistic system work. Sometimes in the initial stages, there are resupply problems and they have to be resolved. But it is best to use the system rather than circumventing it. However, special procedures may be necessary for unique requirements. Sometimes the commander will have to go "outside the system." It is the logistician's job to know where the "pressure points" are, and to advise the commander where best to apply that pressure.

Sufficient time should be planned to develop contracting arrangements with local vendors and coordinate these with the U.S. Department of State. Because of legal restrictions or the nature of the local economy, an extensive amount of time may be required to coordinate and implement some contracts.

Local Economy Considerations. The commander and his logistician must be sensitive to the local economy and conditions, particularly when obtaining food and other supplies, to avoid offending the local population. For example, in Honduras, if the U.S. forces had bought eggs from local sources, the demand would have exceeded the supply, and prices would have been driven up so high that the local residents would not have been able to afford them. However, there was no similar problem in obtaining oranges from local sources. On the other hand, some items (such as ice), available on the local economy, cannot be used because of medical precautions.

The logistician must also be sensitive to political realities. Mistakes may jeopardize the ability of the United States to support friendly governments, attain objectives, and carry out policies. In addition, there is a lot of pressure to provide adequate security for both personnel and logistic resources.

Many requirements for health and morale are important and cannot be neglected or deferred. In Honduras, for example, tropical huts were needed instead of tents because of the heat and other environmental considerations. The commander must take care of the troops, and that includes providing PX support and emphasizing similar quality-of-life support.

Another point that General Schlossberg made is that training and combined operations with indigenous forces in peacetime can provide many dividends. For example, medical units have a lot of potential. The response to medical assistance in Honduras by the local residents was overwhelming.

Following his assignment as the JTF Commander, General Schlossberg wrote a memorandum which discusses several other logistic considerations. A copy is included in Appendix D.

LOGISTIC DOCTRINE

The seminar group discussed the need for logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict. Several initiatives are addressing this requirement.

Joint Logistic Doctrine. The requirement for a basic joint logistic doctrine is being addressed by the Joint Logistic Doctrine Working Group that was formed in April 1986 under the guidance of the Joint Logistic Techniques and Procedures Board. The group was formed because of the need to develop a succinct document of logistic doctrine in support of joint military operations at all levels of conflict.

The first draft of the proposed doctrine was distributed in October 1986 to working group members. Several responses have been quite extensive, requiring significant changes in both the scope and direction of the document. Final coordination and publication of a joint logistic doctrine is projected to be completed by December 1987.

Actions to develop a joint logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict will be coordinated by the seminar participants with the efforts of the Joint Logistic Doctrine Working Group to ensure LIC concepts are consistent with the basic ideas of the joint logistic doctrine. To be useful from a joint perspective, proposed drafts must be oriented towards fundamental principles (see Figure 2) and less towards techniques and procedures that are developed from doctrinal statements.

DOCTRINE

**FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES BY WHICH THE MILITARY FORCES
OR ELEMENTS THEREOF GUIDE THEIR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. IT IS AUTHORITATIVE BUT REQUIRES
JUDGMENT IN APPLICATION.**

Figure 2

- JCS PUBLICATION 1

Concept Paper. OJCS/J-4 SCAD has developed a paper that examines the role of logistics in low intensity conflict. It also discusses several logistic initiatives being developed by the Joint Staff and the Services to improve the capabilities of the United States and friendly governments to respond to LIC challenges. A draft of the paper was reviewed by the seminar group. A copy is included at Appendix E.

The paper will form the basis of a presentation on "Logistical Initiatives for Low Intensity Conflict" will be given by OJCS/J-4 SCAD next month at a Low Intensity Conflict Symposium. The symposium is being sponsored by U.S. Southern

Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Army Materiel Command during 3-5 March 1987 at the Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida. It will be conducted with administrative support of the American Defense Preparedness Association and will be held as a planning session for industry.

The purpose of the symposium is to provide an overview of low intensity conflict for U.S. industry, so that operational and materiel requirements can be addressed. Specific topics will include the politico-military perspective, the implications for U.S. forces, the materiel development process, training, and DOD organizational initiatives for low intensity conflict.

Army Logistic Concept. As discussed in the OJCS/J-4 Seminar Report, 19 November 1986, on "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict," the U.S. Army has been developing an Interim Operational Concept (IOC) for Logistics Support in Low Intensity Conflict. The concept has been prepared by the Concepts and Doctrine Directorate of the U.S. Army Logistics Center (USALOGC). It was approved by Lieutenant General Tuttle, Commanding General of USALOGC, on 12 February 1987.

The concept discusses logistic support for the major mission areas of terrorism counteraction, peacekeeping operations, foreign internal defense, and peacetime contingency operations. It examines logistic subjects such as supply and services, maintenance, and transportation and emphasizes those logistical applications that differ from existing doctrine.

The IOC augments existing U.S. Army doctrine and provides planning and operational guidance for Army logistic operations in low intensity conflict. It will be incorporated into FM 100-20, the Army's keystone manual for LIC, and FM 100-10, Combat Service Support. The IOC is included as Appendix F to this report.

Air Force Doctrine. U.S. Air Force logistic doctrine is contained in AFM 1-10 (formerly AFM 2-15), Combat Support Doctrine, which was published in late 1985. The Air Force is now developing several adjuncts of the basic logistic doctrine to parallel this manual. Three are being considered to address logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict, high intensity conflict, and space.

RAF Wing Commander Alex Buchan, the project officer, discussed how the USAF logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict will be organized using the resource elements and principles outlined in the basic logistic doctrine. A draft is being developed and will be available for comment in approximately four months.

CLIC Draft Doctrine. The U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) has developed a draft Army-Air Force Joint Logistics Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict. (OJCS/J-4 Seminar Report, 19 November 1986, on "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict" provides information on the charter and activities of the CLIC.)

Copies of the draft CLIC doctrine were provided to seminar participants by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Furr who asked for comments and suggested improvements. The draft doctrine discusses logistic support in low intensity conflict, examines requirements for logistic capabilities, and identifies several considerations for logistic operations in each major LIC mission. It is designed to serve as a basis for subsequent doctrinal publications.

In addition, the CLIC is examining the possibility of publishing FC 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, as a joint Army-Air Force document.

Logistics in LIC from USSOUTHCOM Perspective. Major Mark Costa, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), discussed logistics in low intensity conflict from a USSOUTHCOM perspective.

The logistic concept should include four elements -- policies, procedures, programs, and procurement. Programs that require CINC involvement include economic support funds, security assistance, and minimum essential security assistance requirements (MESAR). The CINC should have the authority to procure resources needed for his command.

USSOUTHCOM strategies for low intensity conflict emphasize the development of a strong, professional, apolitical host country military forces. In addition, USSOUTHCOM plans to provide combat support and combat service support when needed.

USSOUTHCOM has set up three levels of planning groups to develop strategies and monitor progress. The highest level and the centerpiece of the planning group process is the Combined Planning Commission (CPC). The CPC meets quarterly (as schedules permit) and includes USCINCSO, selected staff members, the country team, and the host country's government and military leadership. The next level is the Task Force, which is composed of USCINCSO, primary staff members, component commanders, and the military group (MILGP) commander. The Task Force monitors specific issues of concern to the commanders. The Operational Planning Group (OPG), the lowest level, is composed of USSOUTHCOM staff personnel and supports the planning efforts of the CPC and the Task Force. The OPG monitors USSOUTHCOM initiatives and develops the CPC agenda.

The USSOUTHCOM briefing on its planning group process is at Appendix G, and a fact sheet which provides additional information is included at Appendix H.

U.S. National Security Strategy Report. A new report that the President will submit annually to Congress can provide important information for logistic planners in developing concepts and doctrine for low intensity conflict. In January 1987, the White House issued a National Security Strategy Report, entitled "National Security Strategy of the United States." The document, in pamphlet format, is a report by President Reagan on the fundamentals of U.S. national security strategy, U.S. foreign policy, U.S. defense policy, and U.S. capabilities for executing its national security strategy. (This report is a new requirement that was prescribed by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Copies have been also provided to the news media through DOD public affairs offices.)

In discussing U.S. defense policy, the report includes a section on low intensity conflict. It summarizes major causes of low intensity conflict, threats to U.S. security, and U.S. policy for dealing with LIC situations. It notes that the principal military instrument in low intensity conflict is security assistance, usually consisting of "technical training and logistical support." The section of the report that discusses low intensity conflict is included in Appendix I.

LOGISTIC PLANNING ISSUES

The seminar next discussed several major logistic planning issues and projects. These ranged from actions to improve logistic planning and system development to the logistic implications of recent organizational changes.

International Handbook for Logistic Systems Development. Many developing countries face similar problems in logistic management, training, system design, procedures, planning, documentation, and command emphasis. OJCS/J-4 is sponsoring a project to prepare a handbook for use by U.S. friends and allies in examining and improving their logistic systems. The handbook is being written by the U.S. Army Logistics Center. Project officers are Lieutenant Colonel George Alexander, USA, OJCS/J-4, and Colonel William Norman, USA, U.S. Army Logistics Center.

This project will help enhance the quality of indigenous logistic capabilities. It addresses the problem identified by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in his 1987 report to the U.S. Congress that "the key to combatting this subtle

form of aggression [low intensity conflict] . . . is the quality and reliability of a nation's indigenous military forces."

The handbook will be used by developing nations in determining their requirements for logistic systems and improving their procedures. It will emphasize the importance of logistics and will present basic tasks, principles, support concepts, and common data elements.

Changes that were received to the first draft have been reviewed and incorporated into a revised draft that will be completed by the end of March 1987. It will then be translated into Spanish, French, and Arabic.

OJCS/J-4 is arranging for the handbook to be reviewed by several countries for correct terminology in their language and to be evaluated this summer by U.S. security assistance personnel. In addition, it will be briefed at the Sixteenth Pacific Area Senior Officers Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) that will be held at the U.S. Pacific Command during 22-26 June 1987. The handbook will be distributed at the conference, and PASOLS members will be invited to participate in a field test of the handbook.

PASOLS member nations include Australia, Bangladesh, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States. Observer nations invited to attend the June meeting include Brunei, Burma, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Representatives from these nations at PASOLS are senior Service or defense-level officials in logistic or logistic-related positions.

Critical Items for Low Intensity Conflict. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Armstrong, OJCS/J-4 Logistic Planning Division, discussed improvements planned for developing the Critical Items List (CIL) and identifying comprehensive data on each CIL item. Critical items are those that are significant to an operation plan (shortages would significantly affect or restrict mission accomplishment), have long production leadtimes, are high cost, or some similar characteristic. Procedures for identifying of critical items must also recognize the requirements for low intensity conflict.

Up to 50 data elements will be collected for each item (see Figure 3). They include such information as inventory data (stock levels, shortages, etc.); procurement data (cost data, funding profile, current buy program, etc.); production data (contractor, industrial status, sources, substitutability, foreign vulnerability, etc.); usage rates (including battle

loss rate); and requirements by each CINC for three levels -- high intensity, mid intensity, and low intensity. The total requirement for each critical item must include the requirements for low intensity conflict.

CINC CITES INPUT

- * CRITICAL ITEM
- * CRITICAL ITEM RANK
- * IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (NSN/DODIC)
- * REQUIREMENTS DATA
 - D-DAY REQUIREMENT
 - D-DAY STOCK LEVEL
 - D-DAY SHORTFALL
- * CINC OPERATIONS
 - REQUIREMENTS BY MONTH
 - PREPARED FOR THREE LEVELS
 - HIGH INTENSITY
 - MID INTENSITY
 - LOW INTENSITY
- * CINC OPLAN USAGE RATES
 - BATTLE LOSS RATE
 - EXPENDITURE RATE

Figure 3

OJCS/J-4 is developing the Critical Items List Decision Support System (CILDSS), which is an automated tool that can be used at the CINC level as well as within OJCS to prioritize CIL items and improve the logistic assessment of war plans. CILDSS will be able to consider multiple attributes (priority, long-term impact, short-term impact, contribution to plans, industrial responsiveness, etc.) in comparing CIL items.

A prototype of the JCS critical items data base, Critical Items Tracking and Evaluation System (CITES), is being developed. It will be tested by OJCS during March - October 1987 which will be followed by additional field testing from September 1987 to February 1988. It will be used in future exercises to compare OPLAN requirements against the industrial base capability for selected critical items.

Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project Final Report. Major Monty Ayers, U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, reviewed the logistic recommendations of

the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (JLICP) Final Report that was completed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in mid-1986 and the actions being taken to implement them. (The OJCS/J-4 Seminar Report, 19 November 1986, on "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict" summarizes the background, purpose, and results of the JLICP Final Report and includes the chapter of the report that discusses logistic issues and and recommendations.)

The U.S. Army has identified lead agencies for the issues that require only internal actions within the U.S. Army without any other work by the joint community. The U.S. Army Logistics Center has been proposed as the lead agency for the following recommendations:

- ° F1, The Use of Combat Support/Combat Service Support as the Lead Elements in Low Intensity Conflict Operations;
- ° F2, The Use of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield to Support Battlefield Logistic Functions; and
- ° F3, The Feasibility of Local Resupply in Undeveloped Theaters.

Issues F4, The Need for Joint Logistic Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict, and F5, The Need to Improve Logistic Doctrine to Support a Joint Task Force Operating for an Extended Period, are unassigned.

The LIC Proponency Office at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College will be receiving reports on the status of actions taken and recommendations for further actions for each issue. These will be provided to the Center for Army Lessons Learned and will be disseminated to affected agencies.

Logistic Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict. Logistic intelligence is important in low intensity conflict. This assessment is one of the five major logistic issues addressed in the JLICP Final Report. Particularly critical in the low intensity conflict environment is specific information on logistic resources. The logistic planner needs to know the location, status, and availability of supplies and materiel from indigenous sources near an area of operation. Better planning tools are needed to identify what logistic information is available, how current it is, and how it can be accessed when contained in automated data bases.

The U.S. Army Logistic Center has recognized the need for better tools for the logistic planner and has developed a computer program known as Locally Available Materiel and Services (LAMS). Demonstration software is available from the USALOGC. LAMS has been tested in Honduras and its value has been demonstrated for recording and maintaining specific information on local sources for each class of supply.

However, additional work needs to be done. For example, past LIC experiences should be reviewed to determine what information was not immediately available to the logistic planner when needed. Some logistic data may be generally available, but they are not always in an useable format or location needed by the logistic planner within the time constraints imposed. In addition, static information (such as port information, POL facilities, etc.) may be available, but it may have to be verified or updated before it can be used for contingency planning.

The seminar participants were asked to examine the problems of logistic intelligence in LIC as they develop initiatives to improve logistic planning. This topic will be considered as a specific issue to be addressed in a future meeting.

Implications for Logistic Planners of USSOC Establishment.
Lieutenant Colonel C. M. Stancil of the Special Operations Command (SOC) Implementation Task Force (SOCITF), Joint Special Operations Agency, outlined recent changes in DOD management of special operations.

In an amendment to Section 106 of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress prescribed organizational changes in DOD components involved in special operations and low intensity conflict. Major elements of this legislation (see Figure 4) create an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), a new unified combatant command for special operations, and a separate program category (to be known as Program 11) within the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP)

SOF LEGISLATION

- DEP ASSIGN TO PRES. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (LIC)
- BOARD FOR LIC IN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
- ASD FOR SO AND LIC (POLICY AND RESOURCE)
- OSD STAFF AUGMENTED
- UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDER
- 4-STAR COMMANDER
- COMMAND PREPARED TO DEPLOY
- FLAG-RANK AS CDR SOCEUR & SOCPAC
- PROGRAM 11
- PROCUREMENT OF LIMITED OFF-THE-SHELF EQUIPMENT
- SOF BUDGET CHANGED BY SECDEF ONLY

Figure 4

to consolidate SOF-unique funding. These changes were part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987. The section of this act concerning low intensity conflict is included in Appendix J to this report.

The new ASD(SO/LIC) will report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Included in the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) will be a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Resources. This individual will be responsible for reviewing USSOC proposals for developing and acquiring equipment, materiel, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations as well as supervising the preparation and justification of program and budget proposals to be included in FYDP Program 11 for SOF.

The new command - United States Special Operations Command (USSOC) - will be activated on 16 April 1987. Forces will be assigned in accordance to the legislative guidance as shown in Figure 5.

Forces Assigned

"Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the special operations command."

Figure 5

On 23 January 1987, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) be disestablished to provide the billets and facilities needed for USSOC. USREDCOM missions will be transferred to other commands. USSOC will be headed by a four-star CINC with the initial headquarters manning as shown in Figure 6.

HQ USSOC

- Form USSOC with 4-star CINC, 3-star DCINC, 2-star Chief of staff, 7 total GO/FO billets.
- Provide joint staff based on mission and functions; J-1 through J-7.
- GO/FO billets: J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5.
- Establish JAMP at 280 spaces initially.
- PBD establishes JMP:
 - FY 87-- 64 military, 16 civilians (out of bid) = 80.
 - FY 88-- 250 military, 56 civilians (and strength increase) = 306.
 - FY 89-- 390 military, 56 civilians (and strength increase) = 446.

Figure 6

The principal function of USSOC will be to prepare special operations forces to carry out their assigned missions. In addition to having command authority similar to that of other combatant commanders (see Figure 7), USCINCSOC has had several

COMMAND AUTHORITY OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS

- Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands... including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training and logistics.
- Prescribing chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- Organizing commands and forces within the command as he considers necessary.
- Employing forces within that command as he considers necessary.
- Assigning command functions to subordinate commands.
- Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned.
- Exercising authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening court-martials.

Figure 7

specific roles defined by Congress (see Figure 8). These include validating requirements and establishing priorities within the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS); developing and acquiring SOF-peculiar equipment; and acquiring SOF-peculiar materiel, supplies, and services. The Service staffs previously have had the responsibilities to validate requirements and to develop and procure equipment for the CINCs.

Legislated Roles for USCINCSOC

- Develop strategy, doctrine, tactics.
- Training of assigned forces.
- Conducting specialized courses of instruction for officers and NCOs.
- Validating requirements.
- Establish priorities for requirements.
- Ensuring combat readiness and interoperability of equipment and forces.
- Developing and acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment and acquiring special operations-peculiar materiel, supplies, and services (including Program II).
- Formulating and submitting requirements for intelligence support.
- Monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations officers.
- "responsible for monitoring the preparedness of special operations forces assigned to other unified commands to carry out assigned missions"

Figure 8

In this regard, USCINCSOC will be unique among the CINCs in that he will have contracting authority of his own to purchase equipment and supplies. However, some SOF-peculiar items may be procured and maintained by the Services for USSOC. In addition, USSOC will rely on the Services for some continuing and sustaining logistic support. Agreements between the Services and USSOC will be needed to clarify and define specific Service responsibilities that USCINCSOC wants them to carry out for the new command. Joint and Service logistic planners must consider the new command's legislated responsibilities, requirements, and coordination in their PPBS activities.

The DOD status report sent to Congress in mid-February 1987 on the progress at that time in implementing Section 106 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is included at Appendix K.

NDU Low Intensity Conflict Gaming System. The War Gaming and Simulation Center (WGSC) of National Defense University (NDU) is developing a Low Intensity Conflict Gaming System. Mr. E. A. (Sasha) Taurke of NDU discussed the system's design, player decisions, objectives, and development schedule. The briefing on the LIC Gaming System is included in Appendix L.

Sponsors of the project include NDU and USSOUTHCOM. Other agencies are interested in its development and may be joining the sponsors for continuing work. The LIC Gaming System is being developed by Booz-Allen & Hamilton, which had previously developed a similar architecture for a political stability (POLSTAB) model.

The LIC Gaming System will be used to examine LIC issues and has been structured under the assumption that low intensity conflict can be described as an interaction of contending or coalescing groups. It will assist analysts in determining the power index of basic groups in low intensity conflict by weighing various factors such as coercive assets (weapons, personnel, etc.); economic assets (employment, income, etc.); and other assets. The gaming approach will allow analysts to develop a range of possible outcomes rather than a point estimate.

The project is now in the design phase, which will be completed by September. The final phase -- testing and training -- will be completed in March 1988, and the entire game will be delivered then. The game does not play logistic issues per se, but logistic players can make inputs (such as the allocation of resources and the status of assets) as part of the player cells.

A team of functional experts and other advisers has assisted NDU in reviewing the system's development. Several seminar participants have been participating in this process. In addition, the assistance of the seminar group was offered to NDU and is available to provide additional logistic guidance and feedback during the project's development.

C-17 Capabilities for Low Intensity Conflict. Capabilities of the C-17 were discussed by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Ross, Airlift and Special Operations Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. The C-17 will have several operating characteristics (see Figure 9) which make it more applicable than current U.S. airlift aircraft for low intensity conflict.

AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT COMPARISON

	C-130H	C-141B	C-17	C-5 MOD
Max Take-Off Gross Weight (2.25G)	173,700	343,000	570,000	769,000
Max Allowable Cabin Load (ACL) (2.25G)	46,900	90,200	172,200	242,500
Range at Max ACL (Nautical Miles)	1,000	1,970	2,300	1,700
Cargo Compartment Size (Feet) (LxWxH)	41/10.3/9.0	93/10.3/9.1	87/18/12.3	121.1/19.0/13.5
Number of Pallets	5 1/2	13	18	36
Cruise Speed (Knots True Air Speed)	300	425	456	450
Engine Thrust (Pounds)-Sea Level(SL)/Standard Day	4,910 SHP*	21,250	37,000	39,000
Critical Field Length at Max Takeoff Gross Weight	5,450	7,500	7,600	12,500
Landing Distance Max ACL - SL/90°/50' Obstacle	3,800	4,600	3,000	4,100
Wing Span (Feet)	133	160	165	223
Minimum Pavement (Feet) - 180° Turn	63/50	137	111/80	150
Minimum Taxiway (Feet)	40	50	50	60

*SHP = Shaft Horsepower

Figure 9

It will be able to carry about four times the average load of a C-130. More importantly, the C-17 will be able to provide direct delivery of cargo to many airfields (see Figure 10) where current strategic airlift aircraft cannot operate. This will permit quicker delivery to many developing nations of disaster relief, hospital supplies, engineering equipment, and other logistic assistance for the low intensity conflict environment.

The U.S. Air Force program calls for 210 aircraft to be bought to field 180 primary aircraft authorizations. The FY 1987 program contains the first funding -- \$35 million for long-lead procurement -- with the first two aircraft being bought in FY 88. Initial operational capability (delivery of the twelfth production aircraft) is scheduled for FY 92.




Figure 10

ARG/MAU(SOC) Logistics. Lieutenant Colonel Tom Hayden, USMC, Logistics Plans, Policies, and Strategic Mobility Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, discussed logistic considerations of the ARG/MAU(SOC) concept.

The ARG/MAU(SOC) concept has been shaped by a study that was conducted by the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Atlantic on force projection across the entire spectrum of warfare, including special operations, and the potential employment of the FMF to conduct maritime-oriented special operations.

Fleet Marine Forces deployed to the fleets are capable of conducting several special operations missions. For example, the ones assigned to Landing Force Sixth Fleet (LF6F) include those listed in Figure 11.

To prepare for these missions, units train for six months before they are deployed to the fleet. Several special operations training goals have been established for the normal ARG/MAU(SOC) missions -- for example, amphibious raid,

LF6F MISSION

AS A CONTINGENT OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, IS TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS OF LIMITED DURATION, ACT AS ADVANCE FORCE FOR A FOLLOW-ON LARGER MAGTF (E.G., MAB FWD) AND TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE CAPABILITY ACROSS A WIDE SPECTRUM OF CRISIS/CONTINGENCY BY CONDUCTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS INCLUDING:

AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS	FIRE SUPPORT CONTROL
SECURITY OPERATIONS	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) OPERATIONS
LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK	INITIAL TERMINAL GUIDANCE
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	ELECTRONIC WARFARE
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)	CLANDESTINE RECOVERY OPERATIONS
SHOW-OF-FORCE OPERATIONS	SPECIALIZED DEMOLITION OPERATIONS
REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS	MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)
CIVIL ACTIONS	TACTICAL RECOVERY A/C AND PERSONNEL (TRAP)
DECEPTION OPERATIONS	IN EXTREMIS HOSTAGE RESCUE

Figure 11

noncombatant evacuation operations, reinforcement operations, and initial terminal guidance. Details of these goals and the notional organizations of the Marine Amphibious Unit, the Marine Amphibious Brigade, and the Marine Amphibious Force are included in Appendix M.

Additional information on potential Marine organizational alignments and operational techniques for supporting the ARG/MAU(SOC) concept is included at Appendix N.

OTHER DISCUSSION

Interface with JLTPB. Participants discussed the need for the seminar group to be a more formal working group, possibly meeting under the auspices of the Joint Logistic Techniques and Procedures Board (JLTPB). The JLTPB has previously shown interest in this area.

At the last JLTPB meeting on 29-30 October 1986, a briefing by the U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) was presented on its organization, mission, and activities. During this meeting, the JLTPB directed that the Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division of OJCS/J-4 maintain contact with the CLIC in the development of joint logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict.

The JLTPB is chaired by the Director for Logistics, OJCS, and first met on 10 October 1985. The board was formed to solve joint logistic problems being faced by the CINCs. Its primary objective is to address and develop new logistic

doctrine, techniques, and procedures. OJCS/J-4 is in the process of obtaining formal JCS approval of the JLTPB Terms of Reference.

The board has established four working groups to examine specific issues involving ammunition, POL, budget and logistic doctrine. The next JLTPB meeting will be held 4-5 May 1987 at the Belmont Conference Center, Elkridge, Maryland. The board will consider at this meeting adding logistics in low intensity conflict as one of its working group. When the seminar group transitions to a JLTPB working group, it will have a mechanism to raise problems to senior leadership, make recommendations, task actions to Service and CINC representatives, and report the status of the group's activities.

Information Sources for Logistics in LIC. The U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict has prepared a bibliography on logistics in low intensity conflict that includes reports, handbooks, articles, and other references. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Furr discussed the list (which is included at Appendix O) and requested additional sources to make the list comprehensive and keep it current.

In addition, in January 1987, the Pentagon Library published a selective bibliography entitled "Central America: Region in Conflict." Copies may be obtained from The Pentagon Library, Room 1A518, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310.

Air Force Logistic Projects. Captain Bob Fuller of the Air Force Logistics Management Center (AFLMC) discussed logistic research projects with possible application to the low intensity conflict environment. Examples include microcomputer systems for contingency operations, tools for automating data collection and reports, an airfield survey checklist, models to compute requirements and perform capability assessments, and handbooks on wartime tasks. (In addition, the OJCS/J-4 Seminar Report, 19 November 1986, on "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict" discusses the Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook that was prepared by the AFLMC in 1986.)

Conclusion. The participants concluded that the seminar was beneficial in providing an exchange of information to assist logistic planners in developing logistic concepts, procedures, and systems for application in low intensity conflict. It also contributed to current efforts by examining logistic planning issues in preparing for and supporting low intensity operations. The participants will

continue their initiatives in coordination with each other and will be prepared to address future taskings of the Joint Logistic Techniques and Procedures Board.

APPENDICES

- A. Agenda
- B. Attendance Roster
- C. OJCS/J-4 Goals for 1987
- D. Memo on "Logistic Considerations in a Bare Base Environment," 22 January 1985
- E. OJCS/J-4 Paper, "Logistical Initiatives for Low Intensity Conflict"
- F. U.S. Army Interim Operational Concept for Logistic Support in Low Intensity Conflict
- G. USSOUTHCOM Briefing on Logistics : Low Intensity Conflict
- H. Fact Sheet on USSOUTHCOM Planning Group Process
- I. Low Intensity Conflict Section of the U.S. National Security Strategy Report
- J. Extract of National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987
- K. DOD Report to Congress on Special Operations Reorganization
- L. Low Intensity Conflict Gaming System for NDU
- M. Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations Capable) Concept
- N. Article on USMC Combat Service Support Battalion
- O. Information Sources for Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict
- P. Glossary
- Q. Distribution

Appendix A
AGENDA

AGENDA

- 0850-0900 Convene in OJCS/J-4 Conference Room
- 0900-0915 Purpose and Objectives
- 0915-0945 A Commander's View: Discussion with BG Schlossberg
- 0945-1010 Status of Joint LIC Project Report
- 1010-1030 Logistic Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict
- 1030-1040 Interface with Joint Logistic Techniques and Procedures Board
- 1040-1050 International Handbook for Logistic Systems Development
- 1050-1100 Critical Items List for Low Intensity Conflict
- 1100-1130 NDU LIC Gaming System
- 1130-1230 Lunch
- 1230-1250 C-17 Capabilities for LIC
- 1250-1315 Implications for Logistic Planners of USSOC Establishment
- 1315-1345 Concept for Logistics in LIC for Latin American Theater

1345-1410 ARG/MAU(SOC) Logistics
1410-1425 Logistic Intelligence in LIC
1425-1455 Service Initiatives
1455-1510 Other Logistic Initiatives/Concepts for Low Intensity
Conflict
1510-1530 Presentation for USSOUTHCOM/AMC LIC Conference
1530-1545 Information Sources for Logistics in LIC
1545-1600 Future Directions
1600 Adjourn

Appendix B
ATTENDANCE ROSTER

ATTENDANCE ROSTER

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>AUTOVON</u>
OJCS/J-4 SCAD	LTC(P) Karl Dahlen, USA	225-9212
	LTC George Alexander, USA	225-9212
	Lt Col Ray Linville, USAF	225-9234
J-4 LRD	Col Ed Gould, USAF	227-6928
J-4 LPD	LTC Lew Armstrong, USA	227-6492
J-5	BG Arnold Schlossberg Jr., USA	227-8156
	LTC Dave Crowell, USA	224-3737
JSOA/SOCITF	LTC Stancil, USA	225-8100
HQ DA/DALO-PLO	LTC T. K. Keller	227-1537
HQ USAF/LERX	Lt Col John McDonough	227-0126
LEXY	Wg Cdr Alex Buchan, RAF	225-6798
XOXFL	Lt Col Steve Ross	227-8964
CNO/OP-402C	Cdr John McWilliam	225-3293
HQ USMC/LP	Lt Col Tom Hayden	224-2812
USCINCLANT/J-4	Cdr Shawn Etter	564-6124
USCINCCENT/CCJ-4/7-PL	MAJ Bob Lehman, USA	968-6433
USCINCRED/RCJ4-D	LTC James H. Glock, USA	968-3821
USCINCSO/SCJ-4-LPP	Maj Mark Costa, USMC	(313) 282-3709
NDU/INSS-WGSC	Mr E.A. (Sasha) Taurke	335-1252
CLIC/CLO	Lt Col Bill Furr, USAF	574-2630
	MAJ Monty Ayers, USA	574-2630
USALOGC/ATCL-CFV	MAJ Michael Gentile	687-4355
AFLMC/LGX	Capt Robert L. Fuller	446-3535
AU CADRE/RIC	Maj Pettersen	875-6628
	Maj Dieckmann	875-6628

Appendix C
OJCS/J-4 GOALS FOR 1987



J – 4 GOALS FOR 1987

- **ENHANCE THE CINCs' LOGISTIC WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES**
- **IMPROVE NET ASSESSMENT OF THE READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF WAR PLANS**
- **SUPPORT PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE WARTIME DEPLOYMENT, RECEPTION, AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF US UNITS**
- **SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF A MOBILIZATION MASTER PLAN THAT INCLUDES ALL ASPECTS OF LOGISTIC WARFIGHTING CONCERNS**
- **PROMOTE ACCEPTANCE OF COALITION LOGISTICS TO IMPROVE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY OF ALLIES**
- **ASSURE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS ARE ESTABLISHED IN APPLICABLE JOINT AUTOMATED SYSTEMS AND EXPLOIT MODERN ADP TECHNIQUES IN LOGISTIC PLANNING AND EXECUTION**
- **DEVELOP LOGISTIC DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS FOR APPLICATION ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT TO INCLUDE LIC**
- **IMPROVE INTERFACE WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WITH INTERESTS CRITICAL TO CINC WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS**
- **INSURE LOGISTIC FOCUS IS RETAINED DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD REORGANIZATION ACT**
- **DEVELOP REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSURED WARTIME LOGISTIC COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY**
- **STIMULATE ADOPTION OF FUTURISTIC LOGISTIC CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES**

Appendix D

MEMO ON "LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS IN A BARE BASE ENVIRONMENT"



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D C. 20310

DACS-ZBAS

22 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

SUBJECT: Logisitic Considerations in a Bare Base Environment, Long-Term
Deployment - Honduras, C.A. Aug 83-Jun 84

This memorandum is written from a commander's perspective. The terminology may be incorrect, the ideas may not be in proper sequence, but the intended thrust is to outline important considerations. An extremely detailed after action report on Joint Task Force 11 (August 1983 - February 1984), and on Joint Task Force Alpha (February 1984 - June 1984), was left with the J-3 USSOUTHCOM.

For this kind of deployment and employment at the joint level, the chances are that the headquarters will be formed on short notice, ad hoc. In the log section it was important to have all the various skills represented. Desire to get the job done and innovation were more important than seniority and great depth of experience. Lieutenant Colonels and below did jobs normally reserved for generals and colonels. In this joint command with all four services represented, doctrinal problems were not an issue. Ways were found to make it work and all fit together.

The following are some random thoughts which may be useful for consideration in other real world or exercise situations. The reader must recognize, however, that this was a peacetime situation, although terrorist activity was a possibility. Therefore, the comments below may not always apply.

- A site survey before deployment is absolutely essential. The log guys can figure out what they are up against, what the port site will allow, what the road network looks like, what the local economy has to offer in terms of food, water, facilities, power, potential for fuel contracts, railroads, long haul truck capability, airfields, both strategic and tactical, dock facilities in terms of both cranes, stevedores, warehousing capabilities for rations, weather extremes which affect log operations, and other host nation capabilities/challenges.

- Commanders need to be convinced that the first guys they want on the ground are their support people. This must be considered in the deployment. Commanders and operators on the ground ahead of support are basically incapable of accomplishing the mission for any period of time. A key team that must be on the site survey and on the first plane in is the contracting officer and his team. They should have a language capability and a bag of money so that they can do good things immediately. On a long deployment spending thousands up front on such things as hooking into local power, water,

22 January 1985

SUBJECT: Logistics Considerations in a Bare Base Environment, Long-Term
Deployment - Honduras, C.A. Aug 83-Jun 84

and sewage will save millions later. Other contracts take a lot of time to complete, so the earlier you start, the better. Contracting officers must be self-starters and motivated. The impact in terms of what they can do for you cannot be overestimated. You may need several contracting officers, depending on the mission and the size of the A.O.

- What is available in the host country to contract can have a significant impact on your force structure. For example: if flatbed trucks are available to move containers, you don't have to have so many truck companies.

- The support commander needs to carefully figure out what he wants to have hit the ground first, both by air and by sea. Materiel handling equipment would be high on my list. There is nothing so pathetic as a support commander and his staff with nothing to do because of an illogical deployment.

- Planners tend to tell you that you have a near impossible situation on your hands. Operators tend to go in and make it happen.

- Most operations planned by other commands outside the country will have almost inevitably ignored key logistic considerations which will cause the mission to fail if not fixed.

- You are going to run into situations from a logistics point of view that no one on your staff has ever experienced before and you really don't know how to handle. Although people forget, the key is simple. Somebody out there in the world knows the answer, and all you have to do is call him and find out. There can be times when this can even save lives.

- Listen to your little people out there doing the job and actually working on the equipment, driving the trucks and the boats. Their innovation is incredible. To ignore it would be stupid.

- If something can go wrong, it probably will, such as your 790 boat with your food losing an engine and being delayed by a week. You have got to have backup plans; ask yourself the question, "If this doesn't get done or if this doesn't happen, what will be the impact?"

- One of the greatest wastes of money in terms of deployment costs is failure to task organize for the mission. We tend to bring too much, and there are lots of pros and cons to this argument such as retaining unit integrity. On the other hand, rarely do we get a chance to really check out the logistics system. On a long deployment you are able to do so, and we ought to take every advantage of these opportunities.

- No matter how you deploy, you give something up. If you deploy by air, you get there quickly, but you can't sustain for long. If you deploy by sea, you get there more slowly but can sustain when you get there. No matter how you deploy, commanders tend to forget the time it takes to clear the port or airfield and move your gear intra theater to where it is needed. If assets are short and roads are bad, this takes a lot longer than you might think and must be thought about ahead of time when considering early missions in theater.

SUBJECT: Logistic Considerations in a Bare Base Environment, Long-Term
Deployment - Honduras, C.A. Aug 83-Jun 84

Computers break when moving from home station to field locations. Therefore, you better know how to do it manually or you are going to be out of business for a while.

- Operators need to be reminded that small punch card mistakes will get you the right part at the wrong place. Ask the question, "how is my process different now that I'm in the field?" When a joint task force is deployed, you are going to find people from different installations all do business slightly differently. It takes considerable time to get all the logisticians to work from the same sheet of music. Once all the equipment is back in operation and the operator bugs are worked out, everything runs smoothly. If I had to put a time on how long this takes, I would say about 45 days.

- Sometimes you simply must go outside the "system." The commander must make special arrangements to bring in parts or whatever if he has got to have them to insure mission accomplishment. This only happened once in a big way in 10 1/2 months and had to do with Blackhawk parts.

- Because of various laws, restrictions, or the fragility of the local economy, it takes longer than anyone would believe to put some contracts in place to support the troops. An example is that Honduras ships Dole pinnapples, Chachita bannanas, and beef to the United States, but it took me something like 10 months to have some of these products appear in the dining facilities.

- Although some things are available on the local economy, don't think that means that you are going to be able to use them. A simple example is ice. The medics absolutely refused to let us use any of it. Check it out!

- Because of civilianization of a lot of our work force, we have lost a number of our skills that we need on long deployments. For example: we don't really know how to handle the food warehouse anymore. Remember you are always going to have guys out there that don't know enough to take milk out of the direct sun when it is 115 degrees. Also, when you ship food from a long way off, especially fresh vegetables, you are going to have a great deal of spoilage that you must factor in. While on the subject of food, you need to be careful to plan up front what kind of ration cycle you want to be on and then be sure you have assets to support it. For instance, how many refrigerator mechanics do you have out there?

- As a general point, recognizing that it is an old platitude, plan for everything you can possibly do to take care of the troops. If you can get PX's operating in the field, do it. Let some one else who is not having to live under the field conditions be the bad guy and say no, because it does not take any practice to be miserable. On this same point, don't forget we have women in the force, and we can't forget their needs. Innovation again can be a lifesaver for morale. For instance, if you don't have enough adequate shower units, give a few troops a few hundred dollars and a couple of large tents, and you end up with a shower facility that will surpass anything in the Army inventory in a few days.

DACS-ZBAS

22 January 1985

SUBJECT: Logistic Considerations in a Bare Base Environment, Long-Term
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- Don't forget your Air Force component -- often they will have equipment such as their Harvest Eagle setup that can help all the troops.

- Speaking of the Air Force brings a point to mind. You've got to watch all your service components and make sure everyone is living about the same. If you have got one group eating C-rations and another eating steaks in two parts of the country, the news will spread like wild fire and become a real problem. The people who come into the theater for a short time to do things such as run your strategic airfields have a tendency to really overdo it in terms of creature comforts and bring more people than they really need to get the job done. If you have a limitation on numbers of people allowed in the theater, this is an area you will want to watch.

- Lack of forward refueling capability for helicopters can be a real show stopper. You will want to plan to have plenty of that kind of equipment available.

- In this kind of operation recognize that the people who run your field laundry, bakery, water points, et al., need periodic pats on the back and visibility with high level visitors.

I think the above points cover most of the key areas.


ARNOLD SCHLOSSBERG, JR.

Former Commander

Joint Task Force 11 and Alpha

Appendix E

OJCS/J-4 PAPER

"LOGISTICAL INITIATIVES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT"

by
Lt Col Ray Linville
Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division, J-4
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

For Presentation at the Low Intensity Conflict Symposium
Sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command and the U.S. Army Materiel Command
on 5 March 1987

LOGISTICAL INITIATIVES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

The challenges of low intensity conflict require the dedicated attention of all military planners, particularly the logistician. As Secretary of Defense Weinberger has stated, "Through the rest of this century, low-intensity conflict (LIC) will be the next most likely challenge to U.S. national security interests."¹

Low intensity warfare is nothing new. Its various forms -- such as subversion, insurgency, and terrorism -- are as old as conflict itself. But as Secretary Weinberger has added,

The growing intensity with which they are pursued by our adversaries in the post-World War II era requires a commensurate increase in the attention we devote to them. Indeed, these forms of ambiguous aggression have become so widespread that they have become the "warfare of choice" over the last 40 years.²

In concert with other military planners, the logistician is also devoting more attention to these challenges. This paper will review the role of logistics in low intensity operations and will present several logistic initiatives aimed at improving the capabilities of the United States and its friends to respond to the challenges presented by this type of conflict.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Defining the term "low intensity conflict" itself can be a challenge, since the dividing line can be ambiguous between peaceful competition among nation states and the aspects of a political-military struggle inherent in a low intensity conflict. In the words of Secretary Weinberger, "In today's world, the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at any time in our history."³

For the purposes of this paper, the following definition -- approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1985 -- is used:

Low Intensity Conflict: A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC.⁴

THE ROLE OF LOGISTICS

The role of logistics in low intensity conflict can be examined from two perspectives -- that of assisting friendly governments threatened by low intensity operations without the commitment of U.S. combat forces, and that of providing support for U.S. forces deployed abroad. Looking at either of these two cases can be assisted by using the following diagram of various "force functions" in low intensity conflict (see Figure 1). It was developed by General Paul F. Gorman (U.S. Army-Retired), formerly the Commander-in-Chief,

FORCE FUNCTIONS




Figure 1

U.S. Southern Command, for use in explaining the nature, problems, and possible responses in low intensity conflict. It arrays the "capabilities or type forces most likely to be used were the United States called upon to cope with a range of increasingly intense conflicts."⁵

As General Gorman has noted, "In most situations involving low intensity threats, the U.S. response will be security assistance."⁶ Logistics is at the forefront of such assistance programs that provide weapons, equipment, spare parts, and other support. As the intensity level increases, additional "force functions" may be applicable. In addition to the predominant role that logistic elements play in security assistance programs, they are also prevalent in the other functions listed on the diagram such as civic action projects, mobility, construction, medicine, and other logistic support.

Commitment of U.S. Support

Since logistic assistance faces fewer constraints than the commitment of U.S. combat forces abroad, it is particularly well-suited as a U.S. response to help friendly governments engaged in low intensity conflict. In a major address on the uses of military power, Secretary Weinberger in November 1984 stated that there are several situations where U.S. combat forces should not be used, and he identified six major tests to be applied when considering their commitment abroad. These include:

- ° U.S. forces should not be committed to combat abroad unless our national interest or that of our allies is at stake.
- ° The United States must have a clear intention of winning the engagement when combat forces are committed.
- ° Political and military objectives must be clearly defined.
- ° We must continually assess the conditions, objectives, and combat requirements and adjust them as necessary.
- ° There must be reasonable assurance of popular support before U.S. combat forces are committed abroad.
- ° The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.⁷

Choice of First Resort

If, in applying these tests, the assessment is that U.S. forces should not be committed to combat, what are the alternatives to respond to threats, particularly those of low intensity conflict? Clearly, logistics can play a vital role and can be the choice of first resort. The situation must still be important to U.S. interests, and objectives must still be defined. However, logistic assistance can be the response to minimize the risk to the United States and to avoid other inherent difficulties that the commitment of U.S. combat forces abroad involve. In addition, the low intensity

conflict environment may require the commitment of U.S. logistic assistance before U.S. combat forces are committed.

SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS

Security assistance can provide not only the basic weapons themselves, but it can include equipment, spare parts, training, and other materiel and services needed to enhance a nation's ability to maintain internal security. As part of a security assistance program, logistic elements can be used to support what is known as "foreign internal defense" efforts. Foreign internal defense includes protective actions to counter subversion and insurgency and other programs to help governments combat low intensity aggression. They can also include economic and political support for developing nations such as programs to build and strengthen the nation's infrastructure to provide the internal security needed to permit economic, political, and social growth.

Logistic Assistance

Projects that are planned for internal development must focus on the needs of the country and also be coordinated with other modernization efforts to balance the country's overall development progress. They not only can promote balanced growth but with other measures can be used to improve the recipient's security and increase its success in meeting the needs of its people. Logistic resources can

be used to provide support in the following areas:

- ° Public health and medical programs
- ° Technical training
- ° Industrial development
- ° Transportation
- ° Public housing
- ° Water resources
- ° Land development
- ° Electric power, and
- ° Food distribution.

In particular, when civilian population areas have been the target of low intensity operations, programs in support of the populace can be enhanced with logistic assistance. Assistance which could be vital in urban areas after an insurgent attack include the following:

- ° Evacuating casualties and providing mortuary services,
- ° Performing health and medical services,
- ° Providing food, water, and essential supplies,
- ° Preparing food or providing the means for food preparation,
- ° Restoring utilities,
- ° Handling refugees and displaced persons,
- ° Assessing damage, and
- ° Removing debris.

These examples show that logistic support can be used to provide a variety of assistance through a wide range of

programs and activities from disaster relief to economic and military assistance. In addition, many technical services can be performed by military personnel in support of development and modernization programs -- for example, engineering projects such as building schools, clinics, irrigation works, and roads.

General John R. Galvin, in a press interview on February 20, 1987, said that within the U.S. Southern Command, more engineering and medical teams would be dispatched on civic action projects.⁸ General Gorman has also pointed out the:

... recognition in the Third World of the value of military engineer units, with the equipment and discipline to undertake construction tasks in remote areas where security may be questionable, or in a natural disaster zone, where operations by commercial contractors is unlikely. And in any less-developed country, military engineers can dig wells, build water distribution and flood control systems, and construct the roads and bridges essential to economic progress.⁹

Assistance can also be provided to assist foreign countries in developing an adequate defense capability. Frequently training is required for equipment transfers when a recipient country receives U.S. equipment. But first, training surveys need to be conducted to determine the host country's capability. These surveys require the participation of experienced logistic technicians.

Training

Logistic personnel can play a vital role in training

conducted as part of a security assistance program for a nation threatened by low intensity conflict, particularly specific technical training that cannot be provided by the in-country advisory team. For example, mobile training teams can be used to meet training requirements that are beyond the capability of the in-country military assistance organization and the host country. The purpose of a military training team is to help the host nation in becoming self-sufficient in training particular skills. Mobile training teams can be useful in teaching logistic skills such as the proper repair and maintenance of equipment. They can also help develop a cadre of host nation personnel who then become the instructional base for recurring training requirements. In this manner, technical assistance can be provided by the United States to develop the capabilities of the indigenous military forces by improving their skills and productivity.

Logistic Units

Logistic units are particularly well suited to provide assistance -- both training and support -- to host countries such as the following:

- ° Medical. Medical personnel can support tactical operations or provide support to the civilian population through civic action projects and public health programs. They can have a primary role in training, national development, and other related areas.

- ° Engineer. Engineering units can perform many low

intensity conflict missions. In addition to providing combat support, they can construct military facilities and support civic action projects such as road construction, utilities, or water projects. Requirements for engineering support may be extensive because of the need to improve roads and construct bridges.

- ° Maintenance. Maintenance personnel can assist in training host nation military forces as well as providing repair support.

- ° Supply. Supply units can provide training and assistance in distributing essential supplies, equipment, and other services.

- ° Transportation. Transportation units can provide mobility support to host nation forces. In addition to training indigenous forces, they can also support civic action projects and other development programs.

Logistic Training for Combat Forces

There are also several areas in which logistic training is required to prepare general purpose forces for employment in low intensity operations. These include:

- ° Resupply techniques, including aerial resupply,
- ° Techniques for loading and unloading,
- ° Procedures for transporting equipment,
- ° Procedures for packaging equipment, particularly for resupply by air,
- ° Simple repair and maintenance instructions for

operating personnel,

- ° Concealment and camouflage of logistic resources,
- ° First aid and general medical care, and
- ° Supply economy.

As can be seen, logistics can play a major role in assisting friendly indigenous forces engaged in low intensity conflict. Logistics also is a critical element in planning for the employment of U.S. combat forces, particularly in contingency operations which are one type of action that can be taken to respond to low intensity conflict threats.

SUPPORT OF U.S. FORCES

Peacetime contingency operations are generally short-term military operations, less intense than conventional warfare. They include the rapid projection or employment of forces such as a raid, strike, or rescue to recover personnel or conduct punitive action. They are undertaken to achieve high priority objectives in a timely manner, particularly when diplomatic or other efforts have been unsuccessful.

Full consideration of logistic requirements can be restrained by planning procedures that call for stringent operational security. However, logistic support is particularly crucial for strike operations and must be responsive to sustain the force. Logistic preparations must consider the force composition and size, duration of the mission, means of entry and withdrawal, timeliness, location,

and other similar factors.

A show of force can be used to lend credibility to commitments or demonstrate the feasibility of military action. However, the forward deployment of military forces must include (and in some cases, be preceded by) adequate logistic support, since the logistic infrastructure in many areas is lacking.

Other possible contingency missions include the relocation within a host country of civilians threatened by hostile action or the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants to a safe haven. In addition to providing logistic support for the combat elements that may be required to protect the evacuees, noncombatant evacuation operations require extensive logistic planning to include facilities, transportation, food support, and other services for their execution.

U.S. Army guidance for low intensity operations recognizes that a:

... vital operational consideration in peacetime contingencies is the potentially pivotal role of logistics. Logistical requirements may dominate the mission, and can present extraordinary demands on service and joint support forces. The missions are likely to be short-notice, unique, and in austere environments. Peacetime contingencies require that consideration be given to developing a precrisis logistics baseline for national contingency force structures that include an awareness of the needs of various force sizes and compositions.¹⁰

In particular, "planning for appropriate logistic support must be comprehensive."¹¹

Logistics in Counterterrorism

Logistics is also a consideration in counterterrorism actions which are measures taken to prevent or respond to terrorism. Although terrorist acts can be part of an insurgent campaign, the recent rise in international terrorism points to objectives less connected with an insurgency than with the goals of terrorist groups to acquire political power by intimidation, obtain international recognition, coerce policy changes, or to obtain special privileges. However, these same objectives can be applicable to a local insurgency as well.

Although the role of logistics in this area may not be as extensive as in others, it can still be significant. Key issues that must be considered include providing adequate physical security protection for storage areas containing weapons and ammunition; protecting transportation networks and controlling distribution procedures and schedules; and reducing the vulnerability of logistic facilities, personnel, and other resources to terrorist attack. These and other antiterrorism measures can decrease the probability that a terrorist act will occur.

LOGISTIC INITIATIVES

Having examined the role of logistics in low intensity conflict, this paper will now present several logistic initiatives being developed by the Joint Staff and the Services to improve the capabilities of the United States and

its friends to respond to the challenges presented by this type of conflict. These projects range from new automated planning tools to handbooks on supporting contingency operations.

Exchange of Information

One initiative that the OJCS Director of Logistics began last year is a series of seminars with the logistic staffs of the Services and unified commands to examine logistic problems that must be faced in developing and providing support capabilities in low intensity conflict. The first seminar was held last November, and a second one was held last week.

The seminars have been held to further the Director of Logistics's goal to "develop logistic doctrine and concepts for application across the entire spectrum of conflict to include low intensity conflict." Both were productive in exchanging information among the Services on their projects, studies, and other development efforts. A report on the first seminar, "Logistics in Low Intensity Conflict," has been published, and a report on the second seminar, "Logistic Planning for the Low Intensity Conflict Environment," will be completed this month.

Doctrine

The seminars have also been useful to get logistic planners not only to address logistic problems in low

intensity conflict in general but also to consider the requirements for logistic doctrine in this area of conflict. Doctrine is important because it is the foundation that shapes how our organizations are formed, how our policies and objectives are determined, and, finally, how our procedures and techniques are developed.

The interservice group has been reviewing the requirement for logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict from a joint perspective. In addition, the U.S. Army Logistics Center has prepared an "Operational Concept for Logistics Support in Low Intensity Conflict." It provides guidance for the employment of logistical support for U.S. Army forces in low intensity conflict. Its objective is to serve as a basic document from which organizations, procedures, and equipment can be defined to enhance the capability of logistic elements in low intensity conflict. The U.S. Air Force is also developing a draft logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict for its units. This effort follows and will be an adjunct of its recently updated logistic doctrine -- called "combat support" doctrine -- that describes the nature of logistic support and its relationship to aerospace power.

Logistic Systems Development Guide

Another initiative of the Logistics Directorate of OJCS that will help enhance the quality of indigenous logistic capabilities is the preparation of a guide for use

by U.S. friends and allies in examining and improving their logistic systems. In his 1987 report to the U.S. Congress, Secretary Weinberger said,

The key to combatting this subtle form of aggression, which manifests itself in open conflict only at the last possible moment, is the quality and reliability of a nation's indigenous military forces, along with its legitimate political institutions.¹²

The guide will be useful to assist developing nations in determining their requirements for logistic systems and improving their procedures. Many developing countries face similar problems in logistic management, training, system design, procedures, planning, documentation, and command emphasis. The guide will emphasize the importance of logistics and will present basic tasks, principles, support concepts, and common data elements.

A draft has been written by the U.S. Army Logistics Center, and it is now being reviewed by the Services, unified commands, logistic schools, and other agencies that are concerned with international logistic activities. When published, it will fill a major shortcoming in advice available from the United States. It will be translated into Spanish, French, and Arabic and used internationally as a guide for developing or improving logistic systems and for training personnel in basic logistic concepts.

Other Handbooks

Other handbooks are also being developed to address

specific logistic problems in low intensity conflict. For example, the Air Force Logistics Management Center has published a Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook to guide contracting officers in supporting deployed units. It outlines legal authorities; discusses funding issues; and presents contingency contracting procedures, responsibilities, and practices. It also includes a checklist of essential items that contingency contracting officers must consider.

Planning Tools

Several other projects have provided planning tools for logisticians. These include SCALP -- Scenario-Determined Computer Assisted Logistic Planning -- and LAMS -- Locally Available Materiel and Services -- that have been developed by the U.S. Army Logistics Center.

SCALP is an automated tool to assist in determining deployment requirements and developing contingency plans. By using logistic planning factors, it estimates the requirements for meals, water, ammunition, equipment, and petroleum products. It can also consider variables in resupply time and geographic characteristics.

LAMS, which has been tested in Honduras, can be used to provide logistic information on the availability of materiel, services, and other resources in a given area of operation.

Other Projects

Several other projects include research and testing programs. The U.S. Army has developed a supply concept for supporting an expeditionary force in a remote area of operations for 90 days or less. A test was conducted in January 1986 in Honduras during Exercise Blazing Trails, and the system is now being used. Several studies are also examining other logistic aspects. These include a research project sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command on "Supporting Third World Nations in Low Intensity Conflict Logistically."

These projects provide examples of the initiatives that have been begun to address some of the logistic issues in low intensity conflict. A question that still needs to be asked is, What initiatives from U.S. businesses and industry are needed?

CHALLENGES FOR INDUSTRY

Clearly, the U.S. private sector can make significant contributions. One is to provide other automated tools that are needed by the logistician to compensate for the problems inherent in planning for low intensity operations. Logistic planners are handicapped by the demand for secrecy and the accelerated planning schedule typical of low intensity operations. The following three factors -- generally characteristic of low intensity operations -- were cited for

some of the logistic problems in the initial Grenada planning:

- ° Short warning,
- ° Little coordination, and
- ° Tight security.¹³

Another contribution that industry can make is to produce the equipment and other logistic items that support the mission and doctrine of indigenous forces. Many items of U.S. equipment may be adaptable for the low intensity conflict environment, but those that are "high-tech" and complex may not be useful in the hands of indigenous forces. As a report prepared for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 1983 stated,

Equipment must be light, easily transportable and disguised or hidden, uncomplicated, and inexpensive -- the individual commander should be willing to abandon gear rather than become its hostage. There should be powerful emphasis on "fire-and-forget" weapons, remotely activated antivehicle explosives and smart munitions.¹⁴

Equipment for Indigenous Forces

There has always been an American faith in technology to provide a military advantage. However, there are several pitfalls to avoid when considering providing high-tech equipment to indigenous forces. These include:

- ° Experience levels. If indigenous forces have limited experience with less sophisticated equipment, it is difficult to train them to operate advanced weapons. It is equally difficult to repair and maintain complex systems and to provide other logistic support.

° Overdependence. Forces with high-tech equipment may be inclined to depend on such equipment by foregoing simple, effective tactics and techniques. Such weapons are thought to be so good that they must be effective which is not always the case. Some advanced weapons may be wanted for reasons of prestige, when they may offer little advantage or application.

° Cost-effectiveness. Frequently the most costly and advanced equipment can be frustrated in a low intensity conflict by human ingenuity and unsophisticated means. "Unconventional countermeasures to high-tech challenges are usually amazingly cost-effective."¹⁵

° Escalation potential. New technology injected into a low intensity conflict may lead to escalation, which could be inconsistent with U.S. objectives and produce distinct military disadvantages.¹⁶

Summary

With the initiatives being developed by the Defense Department, our capabilities to provide the required logistics for low intensity operations are being enhanced. However, the support of the private sector is also needed to meet the challenges of low intensity conflict which, in the views of Vice President Bush, is "the most active threat we face today."¹⁷

NOTES

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Appendix F

U.S. ARMY INTERIM OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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INTERIM OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
for
LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

1. PURPOSE. This concept provides guidance for the employment of logistical support for US Army forces in low-intensity conflict (LIC). This concept relates specifically to US Army forces although it may have applications to other services, joint forces, government agencies, and foreign governments. The objective is to provide a basic document from which organizations, procedures, and equipment can be defined to enhance the capability of the logistics system to provide support in LIC. This concept, together with FC 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, 16 July 1986, will provide the reader with an understanding of how the Army will operate in LIC.

2. GENERAL.

a. Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, psychological, or military objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.

b. The term low-intensity conflict does not describe a specific activity or operation. Operations in a LIC environment are divided into four general categories: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Peacetime Contingency Operations (PCO), Terrorism Counteraction (TCA), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). While these constitute individual concept areas and will be addressed separately in this concept, they may, in fact, overlap. Such warfare, and our way of waging it, poses an unprecedented challenge for logisticians.

c. The US has interests in many areas in which LIC may exist and US Army forces may be committed. Cooperation with the US Air Force will be vital always as will cooperation with US Navy and Marine forces in many cases. In most cases, Army forces will cooperate with the military forces and civilian agencies of other nations as well.

d. The LIC environment is comprised of two main features: The nature of conflict involved, and the arena in which it occurs. In LIC, deterrence has a different character than it does at higher levels of conflict. It is not so much an issue of deterring hostilities through a balance of forces in-being as it is one of preventing or modifying the conditions which lead to hostilities. LIC defies pure military solutions. Such conflicts cannot be won through force of arms alone. LIC is neither simple nor short term. Political, economic, social, and psychological initiatives are necessary to achieve lasting success in the low intensity conflict arena.

e. The potential for conflict is greatest in the developing nations. The intensification of nationalism as a future trend will place greater restrictions on air, land, and sea space. Additionally, developing nations may become

less willing to grant base rights to developed nations. This will lead to a greater reliance on strategic sea and airlift capabilities for the deployment and sustainment of U.S. forces in low intensity conflicts.

f. A principle aspect of LIC is the constraint on levels of response. The difference between military operations in LIC and conventional war lies in the nature of military success. Success in LIC will consist of achieving US national objectives without the protracted commitment of US forces in a combat role.

g. Another feature of the LIC environment, particularly when commitment of U.S. military resources is involved, is a high probability of intense scrutiny by the U.S. and international news media. As the U.S. commitment extends in time or scope, U.S. public affairs requirements will have logistical implications. More information is contained in FM 46-1, Public Affairs.

h. The fundamental principles of logistics apply across the spectrum of conflict. It is the application and adaptation of these principles to the environment of low-intensity conflict that present unique challenges for the logistician. Generally, the main principles that govern the establishment and operations of the logistical system in LIC include the following:

- o Ability to implement in any theater/country.
- o Task force composition, normally of two or more services, capable of organizational flexibility and inter-service support.
- o Routine use of maximum available host nation (HN) and other support to include local services, supplies, facilities, utilities, and transportation support systems.
- o Maximum use of existing fixed facilities such as lines of communication (LOC), ports, airfields, and communications.
- o Minimum handling of supplies. For short duration conflicts (less than 90 days), units are supported by preplanned resupply packages and by requisition.
- o Maximum economy of resources.
- o Optimum use of mobile maintenance teams allowing for repair as far forward as possible including modular replacement of unserviceable components.
- o Maximum reliance on CONUS supply activities or, when appropriate, existing regional support bases for supply requirements.
- o Routine use of both intertheater and intratheater airlift to deliver supplies until surface transportation can satisfy the requirements.

o Protection of logistics elements with self-protection and passive protective measures.

i. In all levels of conflict, the purpose of the logistics effort is continuous support of combat forces. In LIC, logistics elements may precede combat units into the area of operation or may be the only military force deployed. The LIC environment is characterized by inadequate logistics infrastructure. The requirement to properly develop an area into a base support system may require that logistical assets comprise a significant quantity of early sorties. The nature of LIC, particularly in counter-insurgency, dictates a US response that relies on the use of logistics resources to assist other nations in resolving their own problems. A variety of humanitarian and civic assistance programs can be supported by logistics units. In such an environment, flexibility in logistics support is paramount.

3. LIMITATIONS. Low-intensity conflict transcends the normal concept of peace and war and is not limited to any specific geographic area. The logistics systems must operate within the environmental constraints of the host country where the force is employed. The use of locally available supplies and facilities are often constrained by political, economic, and social considerations. The risks inherent in an initial dependence on host country or other friendly nation lines of communication, supplies, services, equipment, facilities, or security must be recognized.

4. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT.

a. General.

(1) In order to separate logistics information pertaining to specific aspects of LIC, this document is divided into four parts: Terrorism Counter-action, Peacekeeping Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, and Peacetime Contingency Operations. Subjects such as supply and services, maintenance, and transportation are discussed in general terms for each category of LIC. The composition of any logistics support organization will be highly mission/scenario dependent, and levels of logistics support may vary within and between each category.

(2) It is necessary to analyze logistical requirements during the development of courses of action and the evaluation of these courses of action. Each phase of the operation must be independently analyzed to determine the support required. Planning for support of LIC operations must be a continuous process. Inclusion of the logistician at the outset during mission planning and force development is vital to the success of any operation. Once the concept of operation is determined, detailed logistics planning can proceed. Supporting plans should be as detailed as planning time will permit. LIC requirements will typically arise with a minimum of warning time and may occur in any theater of operation.

(3) Most logistics organizations are structured to allow units to fit the assigned mission and situation. This flexibility is vital to enable

logistics organizations to meet the wide range of potential deployment situations in LIC. The conventional echelonment of logistics functions is often bypassed in LIC. Direct contact by units in the area of operations (AO) with the wholesale logistics community is essential for responsive support to remote areas. The direct requisition and distribution process, described at Appendix E, is designed to replace rear echelon support units and informal "stovepipe" arrangements with parent units. Simplicity is an essential ingredient of logistics support to allow the flexibility necessary to continue effective support under demanding and adverse conditions.

b. Terrorism Counteraction (TCA).

(1) Terrorism is the systematic use of fear to achieve a political objective. Terrorism constitutes a threat which must be dealt with within the Army's daily operations. The measures used to counter the terrorist threat are referred to as terrorism counteraction. Army doctrine calls for preventive action (antiterrorism) along with reactive measures (counterterrorism) to meet the terrorist threat.

(2) Specially trained US Army forces may be used in counterterrorism, operations, or the unique characteristics of the terrorist threat may require joint measures. Logistics support is often limited to that carried with team members during the operation. Support may be provided by the normal support structure for units participating or by an ad-hoc support element assembled for the operation. Situation permitting, support may be obtained from the host country.

(3) Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. All logistics elements must be aware of this potential threat as it relates to the overall immediate unit mission. Logistics units must ensure their base defense plans include perimeter security, access procedures, and rules of engagement. Reducing the base vulnerability and projecting an impression of that low vulnerability will reduce the probability of terrorist attack. The goal is to provide security of logistics facilities and installations to ensure unimpeded support operations in the AO. The concept for conducting antiterrorism focuses on avoidance, dispersion, and self defense. This may be difficult due to existing facilities or mutual defense agreements and treaties.

(4) Understanding terrorist groups is vitally important when preparing anti-terrorism programs. Independent and state-supported terrorists often rely upon stolen arms and ammunition to employ violence. The inherent weakness in the logistical support system for a self-defense capability makes support facilities a viable target for terrorist operations. Passive and active measures must, therefore, be combined to protect the sustainment effort. Early detection of terrorist activities will greatly reduce the terrorist ability to seize, store, and distribute pilfered ammunition and equipment. Systematic checks of supplies and equipment from shipment to issue will aid in the protection of supplies. Antiterrorism measures are particularly important for

in-country LOCs. Additional security measures may be incurred when surface LOCs are utilized.

c. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

(1) Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in a potential conflict area. The US forces participating in the United Nations Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai provide us with a current example of PKO. (The US Army is responsible for providing a logistical support unit to support the entire MFO.) Although the Sinai Desert is a remote and austere environment, PKO may as easily be conducted in developed, urban areas. US forces will often work with both civilian and armed forces personnel of several nations as a part of a multinational operation.

(2) The basic force structure and appropriate augmentation are situation dependent. Normal logistics support operations should be used to the maximum extent possible. PKO is pursued under peacetime laws and regulations. The support may be characterized by austere base development and a mixed military/civilian contractor support structure. In the MFO, civilian contractors provide custodial support at bases, maintenance of vehicles, and other supply and service functions. Host Nation Support (HNS) may not be a significant factor, because of political considerations derived from the nature of PKO itself. Due to the multi-national and generally non-combat orientation of the operation, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) may be used to a greater extent than in other types of actions. LOGCAP should not be confused with HNS agreements or contracting with local or third party nationals. The LOGCAP objective is to preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services to augment Army forces. LOGCAP is a possible asset if several preconditions have been met and the LIC operation occurs in a country where servicing contracts exist. LOGCAP is governed by AR 700-137.

(3) Since the nature of PKO may require isolated units to be positioned in hostile environments, plans must be made to provide the necessary backup logistics assets to reduce their vulnerability to activities from hostile elements. Planning must be made to allow for sufficient transportation assets to provide for the rapid relocation of peacekeeping forces. If additional transportation is required beyond the organic assets of the peacekeeping force, then the required augmentation should be planned well in advance.

(4) Upon notification, logistics units in support of the peacekeeping force should establish liaison with the task force commander and staff. Timely guidance will allow the unit to begin the detailed logistics planning and preparation required for the proper execution of assigned tasks. US forces may provide logistic support directly to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces under provisions of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945. DA Pam 700-15, Logistic Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, outlines authorities, command and staff functions, and requisitioning procedures. Some of the subjects relative to logistics support for the peacekeeping force which should be

addressed in the international agreement(s) are: supplies and services; use of indigenous personnel; and use of roads, post facilities, airfields, and rail-ways. It is the responsibility of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) to obtain clarification on the details of the mission.

(5) There may be a requirement to develop a special unit to handle logistics. It may be possible to use selected division support command (DISCOM) and/or corps support command (COSCOM) elements to support a deployed force. Logistics elements deploy simultaneously or prior to the peacekeeping force. The possibility of using an intermediate support base located near the deployed force should also be considered.

(6) Supply and Services.

(a) General. Supply support for a deployed peacekeeping force will require longer order ship times for surface shipments than units experience in CONUS. Stockage of repair parts and other supplies should be increased to a level that will support a deployed force for an extended period. Self service supply items will be required.

(b) Class I. There may be heavy reliance on contractors for fresh food supplies as well as dining facility operation. Prior planning and coordination is essential to arrange for supplemental rations. Sufficient veterinary inspection support must be planned to monitor local purchase activities. In addition, some requirements for the meal, ready-to-eat (MRE), or other combat ready meals for members of the force on remote patrol may exist. In a multi-national force, consideration must be given as to the type/content of certain foods for religious or cultural reasons.

(c) Class II. Selected items which should be considered for deployment include tentage, cots, latrine equipment, goggles, mosquito bars, and camouflage screens.

(d) Class III. If bulk fuel is supplied by US logistics elements, it will be contracted for by Defense Fuel Supply Center through existing procedures and dispersed to other peacekeeping force members under the provision of PL 72-264. The capability to test Class III products for contamination is a necessity.

(e) Class IV. Because of the bulk and large tonnages involved with Class IV items, the requirements for these items should be identified early and shipped via surface means. Some Class IV barrier materiel may be purchased in the AO or from third party contractors.

(f) Class V. Ammunition will be supplied through the Standard Ammunition Supply System. The system will be streamlined to eliminate unnecessary peacetime procedures if the situation escalates. If incremental shipments of ammunition are required during employment, unit commanders should obtain a transportation link as direct as possible between the operational location and the supporting ammunition supply point (ASP). In most cases, explosive

ordnance disposal (EOD) support is required. These personnel should contact host country representatives so that procedures can be arranged for the correct method of disposal of munitions.

(g) Class VII. Because of the bulk involved with most Class VII items, projected requirements should be identified, requisitioned, and shipped. Class VII may include the use of commercial style rough-terrain vehicles and equipment from US or foreign sources, US military equipment, foreign military equipment, or some combination of all types. Procedures for retrograde of unserviceable items should be developed prior to deployment.

(h) Class IX. Supply of repair parts (and Class III packaged) may be included within a contract for maintenance of vehicles.

(i) Water. Highly location dependent, water supply may be included in an overall custodial contract, obtained from local sources, or be provided by US water purification/distribution units. Coordination must be made with preventive medicine personnel to test and approve all water obtained from both local and US military systems.

(j) Sundry packs are currently not available without sufficient notice and without proper requisitioning authority. It is recommended that the deploying force initiate a formal request through command channels requesting sundry packs be assembled and distributed until Post Exchange services can be provided.

(k) Services. Services at the base camp for force personnel may be included in the general custodial contract. The extent to which they are established on a permanent basis depends upon the duration of the mission. Graves registration support will most often be reserved for US force operation. Arrangements for the following services need to be made in advance so that they are contracted or included as part of the force.

- | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| o Showers. | o Engineer functions. |
| o Laundry. | o Firefighting. |
| o Barber. | o Sewage. |
| o PX services. | o Trash disposal. |
| o Recreation facilities. | o Electrical power. |
| | o Vector control. |

(7) Maintenance operations may be conducted in an austere environment within a large area of operations. In many cases, primary resupply will be by air. Frequency of maintenance services may have to be increased to ensure equipment readiness during operations in tropical, arid, or arctic regions. The maintenance structure will consist of:

(a) Unit maintenance: Performed by the operator or crew of the equipment, or unit maintenance personnel. It is characterized by minor repairs, cleaning, lubrication, and adjustments.

(b) Intermediate Direct Support Maintenance (IDS): Includes forward repair of items by module replacement and parts replacement authorized at this level. IDS units will be able to organize teams of repairers to support specific systems and their auxiliary equipment. If equipment from foreign sources or commercial style rough terrain vehicles are used, special tools may be required.

(c) Intermediate General Support Maintenance (IGS): IGS will be scheduled as needed by the materiel managers at the EAC level to meet the needs of the theater supply system. Maintenance will include component repair to return reparable exchange items to the supply system.

(d) Depot Maintenance: Depot maintenance will furnish backup support to intermediate maintenance units and assist in technical training to the forces during mobilization and peacetime LIC operations. Depot maintenance will not normally be required for peacekeeping operations.

(e) Host Nation Support: HN contractors may be used to perform maintenance for military and commercial equipment. Use of HN contractors will assist in the growth of the HN's economic base, and enhance relations. As HN contractor involvement increases, the requirement for language qualified maintenance personnel will also increase.

(8) Transportation. Use of terminal transfer teams will ensure timely and efficient movement of supplies from port to final destination. A border liaison element to interface with local authorities can minimize problems if international borders are crossed. Assets must be provided to assure a dedicated transportation capability and to supply the necessary flexibility and mobility to the supported force. Host nation or third party contract assets will be utilized to the maximum extent possible to meet transportation requirements. If US vehicles are to be used, requirements for vehicle operators to have local and/or international drivers' licenses must be determined. Likewise, the road network must be examined before arrival in country. Up to date information on all roads and bridges is required, to include the main supply routes that can be used and restrictions to vehicles (e.g., convoy size, weight of vehicle, times that roads can be used).

d. Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

(1) Foreign internal defense encompasses those actions taken by civilian and military agencies of a government in support of any program taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID requires a cross-disciplinary approach utilizing social, economic, political, as well as military factors. US Army forces may operate in concert with other services, other US government agencies, and the host nation armed forces.

(2) Total preparation of the conflict area is the basis for the campaign. The shape and nature of the effort is determined in coordination with the other elements of national power at the operational level. Its building blocks are security assistance, intelligence, and communications. The whole is bonded together by prior logistics planning.

(3) In FID, logistics may contribute to the resolution of conflict by assisting indigenous forces in the execution of military operations with the aim of making the host country self-sufficient in its ability to deal with the problem. Logistics can also assist in the prevention of conditions which contribute to conflict. This effort takes place on two levels.

(a) At the country team, this effort involves the employment of military assets. Special operations elements or technical/training teams may be the only US military presence, and these teams may keep a low profile for political reasons. For logistics, these are normally small teams orienting on supply, maintenance, ammunition, or transportation support to indigenous force tactical operations. While their immediate purpose is to assist indigenous tactical forces, their long-term objective is to develop a local capability to perform these tasks.

(b) From the Commander in Chief's (CINC's) perspective, the preparation of the conflict area involves the employment of teams or units on a regional as well as country specific basis. Proper preparation of potential conflict areas will lessen the requirement for prolonged employment of US combat forces. The emphasis is on providing for indigenous tactical success, ensuring regional stability, and developing the logistical infrastructure that will replace US personnel. However, if local forces are unsuccessful, the preparation of the conflict area should support contingency plans for the employment of US combat forces if required.

(c) One example of this approach might be the employment of selected logistics elements (i.e., COSCOM) in support of host country national developmental efforts. Concurrent with their civil affairs effort, they train local forces in logistics operations and, if required, could support indigenous forces much as they would US combat elements. This is done, whenever possible, in a manner that complements the CINC's contingency planning. Ideally, the logistics capability should exceed immediate demand to the degree that rapid expansion is possible. Such efforts might include establishment of ammunition supply points, water purification points, maintenance facilities, and LOCs. Close coordination with responsible US government activities is essential in the preparation effort.

(d) Logistics elements should be prepared for the FID mission prior to deployment and should arrive in the host country already established as an effective, cohesive group prepared to begin operations immediately. Enhancement of relationships within the host country has a direct bearing on the ability of US forces to accomplish the mission. Good relationships minimize risks to facilities, personnel, and equipment due to theft, sabotage, and other acts of violence which erupt due to internal problems of the host country.

(4) Humanitarian assistance can be provided as part of a military assistance and counterinsurgency program. The objective is normally to change or prevent situations prejudicial to the interests of the US. The logistics elements involved will be in support of civilian agencies and thus overall command and control of the operation will not be distinctly military.

(5) Logistics support is the primary concern with the military force in a supporting role. Furthermore, in order to carry out humanitarian assistance, careful consideration must be given to a number of planning requirements.

- o Size of the supported population.
- o Deployment and redeployment plans.
- o Approved command and control.
- o Sufficient communications.
- o Area qualified planners.
- o Awareness of the political considerations and legal constraints.
- o Coordinated embassy/military public affairs plan.
- o Local population customs and traditions to include dietary habits.

Finally, the plan must be realistic and executed without wasted effort. Unless forces are specifically deployed to provide humanitarian assistance or to conduct civic action projects, political considerations, funding, and legal constraints frequently preclude military units from making a meaningful improvement to the local conditions.

(6) In some situations, it may be necessary for logistics personnel to assist in the maintenance of essential services, especially if there is a danger to public health. In the worst case this could involve direct control and operation, but the early return of responsibilities to the civil authorities should be encouraged. This requirement may necessitate special training for some soldiers, preferably before their employment.

(7) Supply and Services.

(a) Support for FID may operate on two levels. First, a small requirement will exist for support of the advisory team(s), and secondly, for supply of materiel to the host country (security assistance) for their use in improving military and civil organizations. Field ration supplements, if needed, should be provided through local contract support. Class II requirements may be limited; however, historical examples show there may be recurring requirements for support of both US, and to a limited degree, host nation forces. Bulk fuels will often be provided via contract support, either host country or third party. Construction materials should be purchased from host nation sources. Major end items and repair parts are usually included with the supply of equipment to the host country. Water supply may depend on in-country resources, or water purification/distribution units may be deployed to assist both host country as well as US forces. Services may be limited but are important in adverse sanitary and climatic conditions. Should the U.S. presence increase beyond small teams (e.g., engineering projects, medical exercises, etc.), the size of the supply and service element will, of

necessity, be increased. This is also true in host countries having minimal capabilities to provide support.

(b) Military services may provide some supplies (Class X) to the civilian population if the resources of the country are inadequate. Provision of military supplies will not be to an extent that jeopardizes military operations. Class X supplies provided the civilian population by US military forces include supplies for civilian relief and supplies for economic aid. Civilian relief supplies comprise such commodities as food, clothing, shelter, medical supplies, and other items furnished for the control of disease and relief of civilian distress. Economic aid supplies consist of such items as coal, petroleum, capital goods, raw materials, railroad equipment, and fertilizers. The civilian economy may be a valuable source of essential supplies, and this factor is a consideration in assigning priorities to civilian supply requirements.

(8) Maintenance.

(a) If the level of US involvement increases beyond training teams, maintenance support must be tailored to the units expected to be operating in the region. This will require maintenance units to be aware of equipment and vehicles used by the supported units prior to deployment. This will require adequate review of the table of organization and equipment of the supported units. This review will show what tools, special tools, test measurement and diagnostic items, military occupation specialties (MOS), and which lines of prescribed load list (PLL)/authorized stockage list (ASL) should be increased to meet maintenance demands.

(b) Intermediate direct support maintenance assets should be highly mobile and concentrate on forward repair of items by replacement of unserviceable line replaceable units (LRU). Support should be on an area basis as small-unit operations will be fast moving and their organic support may not be able to follow them. Supply distribution may be changed to authorize the stockage of low-density, high-dollar items which are not normally authorized at unit maintenance level. Fixed repair facilities may not be available and maintenance exchange of critical items may be authorized in lieu of the normal flow of supplies. A flexible depot maintenance base capable of expansion to react to emergency needs in FID operations may be established and sustained by HQDA and operated by the Army or by contract with commercial firms.

(c) Aviation assets are habitually considered for early deployment in a FID operation. Aviation logistics support must be considered as a prerequisite for the advance support elements. The package must contain the proper mix of maintenance, POL (including test kits, personnel, and forward area refueling equipment), supply, technical inspectors, and supervisors to support the initial aviation operational package. In addition to the normal support mission, they can provide training on damage assessment and recovery operations. This presupposes the HN is equipped with aircraft similar to US Army forces and aviation support personnel have time to conduct training without interfering with their principal duties. The extent of technical capabilities

required will be directly related to the availability of air lines of communication (ALOC), projected mission requirements, and the availability of major assemblies and components, particularly aircraft intensively managed items (AIMI).

(9) Transportation. Major roles in humanitarian assistance and civic action projects are sometimes performed by transportation elements. All modes of transport are used to move cargo for civic action projects. In countries where the road infrastructure is not well developed, dependence may be placed upon inland and coastal waterways for transportation. If this is the case, Army watercraft will play a vital role in the support of FID. Rail, water, and motor transport, cargo documentation, and terminal transfer elements have been used to distribute food for United Nations sponsored programs. Properly administered civic action operations will contribute materially to the attainment of FID objectives.

e. Peacetime Contingency Operations (PCO).

(1) Failure to influence a belligerent nation or activity through diplomatic means may necessitate the use of military forces to protect US national interests, rescue US citizens, or execute other operations in support of US national objectives. These types of operations involve the early use of combat forces to immediately correct an unacceptable situation. Such operations are normally sudden, violent, and joint in nature requiring close coordination with all participating services. Peacetime contingency operations include intelligence gathering missions, strike operations, rescue and recovery, unconventional warfare, and demonstrations/show of force. PCO also include assistance provided in coordination with other government agencies such as drug interdiction and disaster relief. All contingency operations are situationally dependent. The range of missions which a contingency force (special units or general purpose forces) may be assigned is large. The subjects discussed cannot be considered as all-inclusive for every mission or requirement. For purposes of this concept, a general discussion of logistics support for combat oriented operations is provided. This is followed by a brief discussion of logistics support in non-combat oriented contingency operations such as demonstrations and disaster relief.

(2) If a contingency force is deployed to a country where formal HNS is available, the logistics force structure can be economically tailored to take advantage of that support provided by the host nation. However, if a contingency force is deployed in an area where there are few or no HNS agreements, the logistics requirements must be met initially by US resources or locally contracted services. Efforts must be ongoing to obtain support from the HN if available, particularly for POL and transportation of heavy equipment. The logistics force structure must be carefully tailored to ensure that requirements are met with the minimum resources necessary. Direct requisitioning procedures are designed for use by an austere logistics support element without the capability to maintain large stockpiles of inventory.

(3) Contingency operations are likely to be conducted in a short duration, limited objective environment characterized by austerity of personnel and equipment. Austerity means that nonmission-essential support is limited in favor of deploying maximum amounts of combat power. Detailed and continuous planning keyed to potential contingencies is essential to arriving at the correct balance of logistics to combat power. The logistics structure will be austere but adequate to support the deployed force during the buildup or until the operation develops. An essential element of the operation plan (OPLAN) is the base development plan (BDP). The BDP sets forth the base facilities to be provided and the combat service support functions to be performed. The BDP is developed concurrently by the joint task force (JTF) commander and the service component commanders, and is included in the logistic annex to the OPLAN. FM 31-82 prescribes Army doctrine on base development.

(4) The contingency force will have its roots in CONUS, designated OCONUS, or in a third country, relying heavily on strategic airlift and/or sealift for rapid deployment and resupply. This allows the force to be maintained from logistical installations in CONUS/OCONUS or from offshore. Due to the unique requirements of PCO (short duration, bare base conditions, limited HNS, etc.), the time consuming maintenance activities and management functions will take place at the CONUS support base with mission ready equipment being returned to the user. If the situation escalates from LIC to mid-intensity conflict, then the support structure in the AO would, of necessity, require expansion and shorter LOCs from the support base to the user.

(5) Shorter range air deployments will be accomplished through the continuing development of vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft. The employment of these aircraft will permit deployment into areas in close proximity to the AO using landing sites requiring a minimum of preparation.

(6) Support for the force is the responsibility of the organization which normally supports the force or which may be assigned to it for such operations. The structure of the supporting unit should be such that it can perform all selected logistics functions until the operation is concluded or escalates to a full-fledged theater of operations. An indigenous force may be available to assist in supporting US forces. The capabilities and limitations of indigenous forces enter into contingency planning.

(7) The contingency force commander is responsible for determining the desired sequence of deployment of the tactical force, supporting elements, fillers and replacement personnel, and bulk supplies. The support commander should coordinate the deployment of combat service support (CSS) units with the force commander and recommend changes in the deployment sequence if a balanced force is not maintained. Usually, direct support (DS) supply and service companies, IDS maintenance companies (maintenance and repair parts supply), transportation units, and ammunition and petroleum supply companies are required early in the contingency operation. IGS maintenance repair parts and field service companies are not normally required. The need for such units depends upon the nature of the contingency and its environment.

(8) Corps and echelons above corps units are of sufficient variety to enable them to be readily tailored to provide necessary CSS in contingencies. Some CSS elements should be deployed into a hostile environment as soon as the first forces land. Other CSS elements arrive as soon as the base support area has been secured. Selected DISCOM units should probably land very soon after combat units. Under certain circumstances, some CSS elements may arrive in the country or in an adjacent country prior to the actual deployment. These elements may arrive by air at a commercial airfield and move to the conflict area to operate the arrival airfield control group.

(9) The support relationship between certain units (i.e., Light Infantry Division) and their corps augmentation must be understood. Due to the austere force structure which provides the means for rapid deployability, those units must have the ability to interface with their logistics augmentation unit in order to provide total support. The augmentation unit will not necessarily be required to deploy with the task force, but must be in a position to support depending on the intensity of the operation.

(10) The buildup of the CSS force structure is gradual and proceeds as the requirement develops. Echelons above division (EAD) elements enter as the need develops. Support elements may be needed before their parent headquarters are required. If EAD support elements are deployed prior to their headquarters, personnel should be designated coordinate for immediate command and control.

(11) Contingency forces may be airdropped, air-landed, or deployed by sea, depending upon the contingency area, the mission, and the time available for deployment. The deployment of the logistics support package must be phased to correspond with the deployment of the combat force. Logistics support units and supplies are normally divided into accompanying and follow-on packages. Contingency forces may be staged near the contingency area to cut down the length of the lines of communication. However, forward staging in itself presents a substantial logistics problem. It requires time, facilities, protection, and can be done only when a friendly country consents to the use of its soil for deployment of war materiel. Forward staging may also decrease the element of surprise.

(12) Deployment and management of support units pass through a series of critical phases. In the early stages of a contingency operation, many of the support units are detachments, teams, and companies without a parent control headquarters. In order to execute effective command and control, some support battalion headquarters should be included in early increments to organize these smaller elements into composite battalions and provide a command channel. This arrangement should be reorganized as priorities and resources permit. As the situation develops, group and brigade headquarters are required for effective command and control and the temporary composite battalion headquarters can revert to its normal specialized role.

(13) Supply and Services.

(a) How the contingency force will be resupplied depends primarily on the mode of deployment of the force, except when the direct requisitioning system described in Appendix E is authorized. For example, if the force is deployed by sea, it, in all probability, will carry its initial supplies and be resupplied by sea with critical items being provided by air. If the force is to be airdropped or air-landed, initial supply will probably be by air. Resupply by air should be used as the primary means of resupply only until such time as the surface LOC can be established.

(b) Supply support of a contingency in an unestablished area is provided to the employed force through a combination of unit accompanying supplies and predetermined, preplanned supply support. Sufficient supplies must accompany the contingency force to enable the force to accomplish its initial objectives and sustain itself until resupply begins. Accompanying supplies cannot exceed the force's capability to carry and secure them. Generally, accompanying supplies will be limited to a unit's basic and prescribed loads, plus very limited additional quantities of items critical to the operation (Classes I, III, V, and VIII). Plans must provide for normal and emergency resupply of the force by surface, air-land, and airdrop to ensure the success of the operation. Plans must also provide for deployment of follow-on logistics support and engineer units and supplies as soon as initial objectives have been secured to permit rapid establishment of the in-theater support bases (facilities, utilities, ports, airfields, LOC, etc.).

(c) Class I. If ground forces are used, combat field feeding (MRE, traypacks) may be the norm. Depending upon the length of commitment and size of the force, T-rations, followed by T rations with A and B enhancements may be used. Initially, all units deploy with their basic load of operational rations (MRE).

(d) Class II. Due to short duration of operations, Class II supply will be provided by normal supply procedures for participating units. The issue of clothing policy is tied closely to the manner in which laundry requirements are met following deployment. Organizational clothing and individual equipment must be issued to filler and replacement personnel prior to deployment.

(e) Class III. Units normally deploy with fuel tanks 1/2 full along with 5 gallon cans. Priority of support sources when available is HNS, LOGCAP, and finally from US sources. The volume of bulk fuel support required, particularly for air assault or ALOC supported operations, necessitates maximum utilization of local sources of fuel. When demand exceeds availability, the task force commander must establish an allocation system based on combat operation priorities. Task force planners must reduce the types of fuel required to the minimum by deploying single fuel types of equipment whenever possible. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) requirements may include fuel for all service components for inland distribution.

(f) Class IV. Barrier and fortification materiel are critical needs in the initial phases. Class IV materiel may be required for base development, protection of stocks, and anti-terrorism efforts. Maximum use of local resources, if available, will be required. Information on locally available Class IV materiel in selected theaters is maintained by the US Army Corps of Engineers. If materials are unavailable locally, planners will have to arrange for early Class IV supply.

(g) Class V. Both Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and ammunition requirements must be considered. Predeployment stockage objectives must be established to support the task force based on unit operational loads and projected rates of expenditure.

- o Operational loads are usually the unit basic load.

- o Pre-positioned stocks are developed to support a specific operation or anticipated contingency plan. These stocks may be pre-positioned in the general vicinity of the AO. This ammunition should be rapidly transportable into the immediate operational base.

- o Sustaining stocks consist of that ammunition moved over LOCs from CONUS, a regional support base, or drawn from wartime stocks in friendly countries.

(h) Class VII. Replacement or resupply will depend upon the duration of the operation, repair capability, and loss rates. Equipment may also be drawn from prepositioned stocks in Europe and elsewhere.

(i) Class IX. Units will deploy to the AO with their combat PLL. Intermediate DS units will deploy with an ASL tailored to fit the OPLAN being executed. Resupply to the operational area will be from CONUS and/or a regional support base via ALOC. Resupply of Class IX requirements will depend upon equipment deployed, duration of the operation, and maintenance units deployed.

(j) Water. Current conventional doctrine applies for arid and non-arid areas. Location of water sources should be obtained from the supporting division or corps Terrain Team during the logistics planning phase. Requirements will be consolidated and, when required, allocations will be made consistent with resources. Logistics units organized for water supply will purify, store, and issue water in accordance with the task force commander's priorities. A water purification team should deploy with the lead elements if potable water is not available in the AO. The use of Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units for salty water purification is necessary; otherwise, conventional water purification equipment can be used. The use of CTA equipment and supplies (iodine, chlorine, lyster bags, and 50/250/500 gallon water bags, etc.) is necessary to augment TOE equipment.

(k) Operational Projects. It is a Department of the Army policy, insofar as possible, to support the requirement of major Army commanders for

special needs over and above normal allowances when such needs are justified. Contingency operations in extreme environmental conditions (desert/arctic) may require equipment from HQDA approved non-POMCUS operational projects and contingency support stocks. These equipment requirements are in addition to the initial issue allowances contained in MTOE, TDA/MTDA, CTA, and levels authorized by AR 11-11, War Reserves. Equipment requirements for indigenous forces are also contained in this category. For authorization for unconventional warfare, (S) FM 101-10-3 will be used as a guide. The establishment of operational projects is a major command responsibility. HQDA elements are responsible for processing, reviewing, and approving the establishment of non-POMCUS operational project stocks. AR 710-1 (chapter 8, section IV) contains policies, delineates responsibilities, and provides instructions for the initiation, approval, and publication.

(1) Services. Field services are divided into primary and secondary services. Only the primary services of graves registration and airdrop will be provided in an austere operation. The secondary services of bakery, clothing exchange, and laundry may be provided when the situation stabilizes. Services may be provided by military service units or by contract. Because of the nature of PCO, HNS cannot always be planned for in advance. However, contracting teams inserted early in the operation may obtain significant resources even in less developed areas of the world. Contingency contracting is addressed in Appendix B. Use of LOGCAP assets will be highly area dependent. If available, LOGCAP can be of significant assistance in contingency operations. In joint operations it is usual for one service to provide common services to one or more of the other services. For example, the Army might provide graves registration support to the Air Force. Cross-servicing should be mutually agreed upon and included in all contingency plans.

(14) Maintenance.

(a) The level of maintenance performed in a contingency area will depend upon the maintenance capability organic to the combat force and the maintenance capability placed behind the force. Intermediate direct support maintenance will be performed by organic units using the mission essential maintenance only concept during the early stages of the contingency. As the situation stabilizes, more conventional maintenance will again be practiced. IDSM units will have the capability to support forward with maintenance support teams. During short duration operations, emphasis should be on direct exchange at the user level rather than forward repair.

(b) Contingency aviation operations may be characterized by increased maintenance requirements due to adverse weather and terrain conditions. At the same time, the importance of Army aviation to the force is increased because of the dispersed nature of the operation and the possibly poor condition of surface transportation road network. During the assault phase of a contingency operation, aviation units deploy with their organic aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) elements. Aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) units will deploy during the build-up phase of the operation. Deployment timing will consider the need for early reinforcement of organic AVIM. Recovery operations may

require that alternate methods of recovery be performed. The assets of the task force will provide a source to draw upon for either air or ground recovery. Additionally, the Aircraft Combat Maintenance/Battle Damage Repair capability will provide an additional method of maintaining availability and providing for a "one-time flight" method of recovery and evacuation.

(15) Transportation.

(a) Initially, the combat force will be dependent upon organic transportation. If airfields are unavailable, the use of airdrop resupply will be required using existing procedures. However, as soon as an airfield or sea port can be secured, sufficient transportation resources must be introduced into the contingency area to establish an in-theater LOC and permit resupply operations. If host nation resources are not available or reliability is in question, US transportation resources must be provided as part of the follow-on force. In all cases, planners must ensure that sufficient transportation units are time-phased into the contingency area ahead of supplies. When appropriate, planners should also consider watercraft in logistics over the shore operations and for use in inland waterways.

(b) Intratheater airlift capabilities can become an integral part of the overall system. In countries where there is no established road net or where geographical features prevent ground transportation support, the optimum method of resupply may well be by airlift. Airlift can be by either airland, airdrop/LAPES, or sling loaded resupply. Air-land is the preferred way because it maximizes the payloads delivered and does not require any special airdrop equipment or special rigging and harnesses. The role of the divisional Aviation Brigade may be expanded to include aerial resupply since ground LOC's may not accommodate additional traffic without significant escalation. Within the contingency AO, the task force commander will apportion the theater assets through the movement control center. For further guidance on the use of intratheater airlift, consult FC 55-40, Intratheater Airlift Operations.

(16) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The IPB currently addresses installation site selection and LOCs in the CSS arena. In logistics, the use of IPB generated data is focused in support of friendly efforts to reduce the vulnerability of its CSS to threat. It does not consider the collection of intelligence data on enemy services with a view to other than targeting for possible destruction and as a secondary means of inducing the enemy commander's intent. Any attack plan should consider a logistic concept of controlled damage to existing microwave towers, buildings, power sheds and equipment, radio stations, airfields, railroads, and POL storage facilities. Under this approach, adequate damage to prevent immediate use by defending forces should be pursued, but not so serious as to prevent reactivation without major logistics impacts.

(17) Show of Force/Demonstrations. Shows of force and demonstrations include the deployment of US forces into non-traditional AOs either as a response to a specific threat or as part of a routine exercise. The first element essential to a military deployment, either the forward deployment or

basing of forces, is the availability of supporting logistics and infrastructure. Continuing exercises offer the opportunity to develop support bases in-country. Such operations will be designed so that they are responsive to combat demands if necessary. Base development necessary to support these exercises improves the Army's capability to introduce forces and expand operations, if required.

(18) Disaster Relief.

(a) Humanitarian assistance can also be provided for relief to victims of natural disasters abroad. Logistics elements can become involved with providing assistance in situations resulting from earthquakes, floods, volcanos, and droughts or famine. Operations are normally in response to an emergency request and are designed to provide immediate relief and rehabilitation. Logistics elements can expect to conduct such operations in the spotlight of international news media. Close coordination with military public affairs elements is essential.

(b) Logistics elements involved in disaster relief will be concerned with a number of primary missions. These may include food programs and supply of other emergency relief items such as blankets, tents, bridges, and water purification. There may be a requirement for transportation assets, both ground and aviation, for operations over an extended area. If aviation assets are required, the appropriate support package must accompany them (maintenance, fuel, slings, etc.). Likewise, logisticians can provide assistance with damage assessment and the internal capabilities of the host country to deal with the emergency. They can provide training to the host country military, and other agencies, to improve the in-country capability to implement emergency relief. Operational projects materiel exclusively for disaster relief in CONUS, Hawaii, and Alaska is outlined in AR 500-60.

APPENDIX A

AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR LOGISTICS CONTINGENCY PLANNING

A-1. The Scenario-Determined Computer Assisted Logistics Planning (SCALP) program is an automated tool utilized to support logisticians in formulating deployment needs and contingency plans. Nonprogrammers created SCALP using "templating" techniques over a low cost, commercial spreadsheet program. SCALP uses a microcomputer resident data base of actual MTOE units, other specific information, and selected planning factors. Each SCALP is tailored for the using unit. The present version tells the deploying logistics planner what he needs to take in the following areas: Class I; CTA 50-900; POL including equipment, duration and storage capacity; ammunition; water; and equipment in the task force. It also gives him general maintenance and medical considerations. Variables in time before resupply and geographic area of deployment are considered. SCALP interfaces directly with the Automated Air Load Planning System (AALPS) and with the Computer Aided Load Manifesting (CALM), an Air Force system. This capability allows SCALP developed data to be input directly into AALPS and/or CALM.

A-2. The U.S. Army Logistics Center also recognized a need for the planner to have information about Locally Available Materiel and Services (LAMS). This program utilizes a spreadsheet program as well, and interfaces with the SCALP template. The output provides logistics intelligence and data on materials, goods, services, and resources in the area of operations. The framework can be adapted to any geographical area. The program includes data on demographics, enemy materiel, airheads, supply and services, and routes. A prototype computer program for Honduras was completed in August 1985. A contracting version of the program was developed for the 193d Infantry Brigade Contracting Office that allows them to maintain information on all countries in Latin America, except Belize and Nicaragua. As in SCALP, the planner would receive printed output of the choices he makes. The user would be responsible for input of initial data and future updates of the data base.

A-3. AALPS is the Army's air load planning and execution tool. The system was designed to provide air deployable units a load planning and execution capability, and contingency planning agencies a gross air load planning capability. It will currently plan loads for the US Air Force (USAF) C-130, C-141, C5 and ultimately, the KC-10, C-17, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft for all delivery methods. It has an interactive graphics capability to provide an aircraft load summary, type load summary, no-load list, and manifests. The Corps G-4 will be responsible for building and maintaining the packages and options for any contingency operation.

APPENDIX B

HNS COORDINATION TEAM (CONTINGENCY)

B-1. With the probability of the U.S. Army's participation in contingency operations or low-intensity conflicts increasing, the requirement to take full advantage of local resources becomes significant in supporting these types of operations. Contingency or low intensity operations could occur in areas of the world where few or no HNS agreements exist. Thus, the requirement for HNS becomes a question of accumulating as much support as possible, as quickly as possible. The HNS Coordination Team (Contingency) must accomplish this amassing of available local resources not only to offset the immediate needs of US forces (e.g., fuel, bulk supplies, services, etc.) but also to establish support relationships with the local authorities that would serve as a basis for firmer long term commitments if required at a later date.

B-2. The HNS Coordination Team (Contingency) is used in theaters where US forces are not forward deployed and HNS agreements have not been negotiated, or in theaters where the HN support structure is immature. The team would be one of the first support elements to arrive in the contingency area of operations. Its task would be to obtain whatever local resources required by US forces that are available. This team would be attached to the operational logistics headquarters which is providing overall support to the combat forces. If it is a division operation, the team would be part of the DISCOM; if a corps operation, it would be a part of the COSCOM.

B-3. The HNS Coordination Team (Contingency), based on logistics requirements as determined by the headquarters of the logistical unit supporting the operation, will obtain, through purchasing and contracting, any required local resources. This support includes utilities, maintenance, transportation, supplies, subsistence, services, and medical support. The team would use all available data concerning local resources that would most likely be available in the contingency area. These data would include the logistics intelligence information of the Scenario-Determined Computer Assisted Logistics Program (SCALP), contingency contracting, and area studies of potential contingency areas which provide HNS information.

B-4. The HNS Coordination Team (Contingency) would augment the logistics headquarters. The team would be staffed with logistics specialists and purchasing/contracting specialists who would perform a contracting and purchasing role with particular emphasis on supplies, transportation, and maintenance. This team would coordinate closely with the Civil Affairs (CA) team supporting the contingency operation. The CA team would assist in the obtaining of available resources by establishing contact with local authorities and/or organizations capable of providing logistics support. The CA team would serve as a point of interface between the HNS Coordination Team (Contingency) and the host country military or civilian authorities/organizations.

B-5. The HNS Coordination Team (Contingency) would also be responsible for the management and coordination of the HNS assets into the U.S. Army support plan as required. It would utilize all possible techniques to obtain the HNS available; i.e., contingency contracting procedures, local purchase actions,

etc. This team must coordinate with the legal and financial activities of the US forces supporting the operation. This would include coordination of financial payments, funding controls, legal requirements (host nation and/or international laws) and any other financial or legal requirements that are necessary for obtaining and employing the host nation's logistical resources.

B-6. The HNS Coordination Team (Contingency) as a minimum would consist of the following:

- Maintenance Management Officer
- Supply and Services Officer
- Transportation Management Officer
- Purchasing/Contracting Officer
- Clerk/Typist

Additional specialists, such as, engineer, signal, etc. may be attached as separate HNS Coordination Teams as required.

APPENDIX C

COMMAND AND CONTROL

C-1. Command and control is the process of directing and controlling the activities of military forces in order to attain an objective. It includes the communications, control centers, information gathering systems, and the staffs and facilities necessary to gather and analyze information, make decisions, and supervise the execution of orders.

C-2. US forces depend heavily on command and control in LIC, and the logistics units are no exception. The communication and automation nets as currently developed provide the logistics elements with the capability to obtain and provide support in a timely manner. This capability reduces manpower redundancy and depth of stockage in the area of operations. The communication/automation information link must be addressed in all planning documents to provide effective two-way information flow. The use of satellite ground stations should be developed to support the transfer of logistical data out of and into the AO.

C-3. Should a logistics element be committed in a FID operation, it is likely to be as an integral part of a larger effort coordinated by the US Country Team. Also included could be civilian agencies and the Security Assistance Organization. Those elements, understanding that a military capability is available, should present this option to the host country in order that the logistics element be employed effectively. An integrated approach is key to the success of the mission and requires close coordination and cooperation between the logistics element of the Country Team and the host country at all levels. The logistics element will be responsive to the ambassador and must participate and coordinate actively with the Country Team, as well as the host country military and other agencies.

C-4. In peacekeeping operations, US forces must be prepared for combined operations with multi-national forces. Agreements on doctrine, principles, and operating techniques may only be partially developed, or may not exist at all. In PKO, US forces may have to work out procedures while operations are underway. Logistical support, while normally a national responsibility, must be coordinated in a combined effort to ensure operational success. Lower level commanders and staff officers responsible for operating as part of a multi-national force will have to resolve the problems of liaison, language, and compatibility of equipment. Effective planning, regional orientation (including language training), and cross training through combined training exercises will help overcome these problems.

C-5. Peacetime contingency operations are always joint undertakings conducted within the framework of the Unified Command System. The command and control needs in contingency operations might lead to forming a joint task force (JTF) from assets within the unified command responsible for the contingency area. A JTF could also be organized and deployed from forces of a supporting CINC and transferred to control of the supported CINC just before employment. The gaining unified command could be responsible for employing the JTF or the

National Command Authority might retain control of the JTF through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

C-6. A JTF is composed of elements of two or more services operating under a single JTF commander. Normally it performs missions having specific, limited objectives, or missions of short duration. It dissolves when it has achieved its purpose. The JTF commander is responsible to the JTF establishing authority. He has operational control over the entire force. He exercises logistical coordination or control only as necessary to meet his subordinate commanders' logistical needs. Each component commander is responsible for the logistics functions normal to the component. An adequate command and control system is essential to the success of the mission.

APPENDIX D

BASE DEVELOPMENT

D-1. Base development is the improvement or expansion of the resources and facilities in an area to support military operations. It provides the framework for the logistics support of the force. FM 31-82 prescribes Army doctrine to assist commanders and staff officers in developing a base. Efficient development and operation of the base in a contingency operation requires close cooperation among both the logistics and engineer personnel involved.

D-2. Overseas bases are developed as a result of policy decisions made at the highest level of Government and are designed to support contingency plans related to national defense. The decision to execute a contingency operation plan is made at national level. The requirement for execution may be clear cut as a result of an overt attack on US or friendly forces. However, a requirement for execution could occur as a result of an incremental response to an insurgent action.

D-3. The Secretary of Defense issues broad guidance to the Military Departments and to the JCS defining the limitations and level of effort required to implement the OPLAN most appropriate to the situation. The JCS evaluation of the situation considers the current BDP, military posture, materiel resources, and other pertinent factors. From this evaluation, the JCS make the necessary decisions and issue authority to execute the OPLAN to the theater commander.

D-4. When detailed planning for an operation is undertaken, the unified commander issues a base development planning directive. In addition to the mission directives, the unified commander obtains guidance for BDP from documents published annually by the JCS.

D-5. The BDP, which is the product of concurrent planning by the commander of a joint command (if established) and the commanders of the component services, is the governing instrument for planning and establishing an advanced base. The purpose of the BDP is to ensure the timely availability of personnel, materiel, and facilities required to support a contingency OPLAN. The BDP will be issued as an appendix to the logistic annex to the operation plan. Of particular importance during the BD planning and execution phases is a total analysis of the additional logistical support required to support the developing base as well as the impact on all forms of transportation and storage in the AO.

D-6. Army Facilities Component System (AFCS) serves as the data source for Army base development and facilities planning/construction. AFCS contains designs, bills of materiel, and specifications for pre-designed, standardized facilities. Engineer construction and logistics requirements can be determined with the Army Construction Automated Planning System, which accesses the AFCS data base. AFCS guidance is found in AR 415-16 and TMs 5-301, 5-302, 5-303, and 5-304. Information on engineer logistics support concerns and contingency support planning can be found in FM 5-100, Engineer Combat Operations.

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APPENDIX E

SUPPLY SUPPORT OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

E-1. An Expeditionary Force is defined as a task force of division equivalent size or smaller deployed to an immature, remote area of operations for a period of 90 days or less. The support concept assumes an ALOC exists and a Supply Support Activity (SSA) deploys with a minimum combat essential ASL. Rapid communications, small computers, and ALOC are the basis for direct requisitioning and resupply of an Expeditionary Force. The objective is to produce an average order ship time of 9--13 days.

E-2. Direct requisitioning on the wholesale system in support of an Expeditionary Force is a further refinement of the Direct Support System (DSS). The DSS employs ALOC techniques and procedures to fly all repair parts and selected class II materiel to SSAs located overseas. The approach to direct requisitioning and support of an Expeditionary Force differs from that taken in the ALOC program in that all classes of supply are brought under the umbrella of resupply by airlift, and is considered more suitable to Army needs for supporting an Expeditionary Force.

E-3. Direct requisitioning is the cornerstone of the Expeditionary Force support concept. A Tactical Army CSS Computer System (TACCS) computer with sufficient maintenance floats, operating the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS-1) supply management system is a prerequisite to implementing direct requisition procedures. Using direct requisition procedures, the SSA transmits requisition data directly through the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS) to the CONUS wholesale source of supply. The intermediate levels of supply management (DS4 and SAILS) are initially bypassed. However, the concept includes procedures for backfeeding DS4 and SAILS to preserve the integrity of finance and inventory accounting. Since the SARSS-1 system depends on DS4 for its files housekeeping (e.g., calculating stock levels, replenishment requisitions, ASL update, excess, etc.) the deployed SSA must conduct a periodic link/download with a supporting DS4 activity by the most expedient means (e.g., telecommunication, floppy disk transfer, courier, etc.).

E-4. The direct requisition concept is totally dependent on telecommunication software capable of linking TACCS/SARSS-1 output (requisition data) with a communications network. The system should operate automatically to establish a communication link with DAAS, transfer requisition data, and receive transmission acknowledgement. Additionally, the system should automatically restore communications and data transmission from the point of interruption, in the event of a power failure or communication outage. The entire communications and requisition transmission process should function without operator intervention, other than the initial keyboard entries required to initiate the process.

E-5. The TACCS computer uses the SARSS-1 supply management system software to execute the direct requisition process. The SARSS-1 system creates a special "to DAAS" file to store all requisitions which cannot be filled, pending direct transmission to the DAAS. The "to DAAS" file includes requests for ASL items which are zero balance at the SSA. The TACCS/SARSS-1 hardware and software used for direct requisitioning is designed to operate in support of an SSA.

Its use and positioning should be restricted to main or forward SSAs, supporting Expeditionary Forces or remote area training exercises.

E-6. The optimum communications system exploits TACCS connectivity to super high frequency, multichannel, tactical satellite (TACSAT) communication systems and access to DAAS via AUTODIN. This type system offers common user communications, less competition for satellite access, high quality/low error data transmission, reasonable transportability, and secure satellite communication link. Communications redundancy is feasible with the TACCS capability to communicate via dial-up telephone systems (e.g., AUTOVON). However, the telephone system requires a receiving TACCS at DAAS and the supporting communications equipment may be scarce and more transportation intensive.

APPENDIX F

LOGISTICS PLANNING CHECKLIST FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

--The following checklist is not all inclusive--

0 References:

00 Is a listing of doctrinal, policy, and procedural publications, appropriate to the level at which the plan is prepared, provided to assist the implementer?

00 Are there any contingency plans (OPLANs/CONPLANs) that apply?

00 Are the necessary maps listed and available?

0 Purpose:

00 Is there a concise statement of the purpose for which the logistic support plan is prepared?

0 General:

00 Does this paragraph provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and concept of operations that the logistics planning supports?

00 Are the objectives specified?

0 Assumptions:

00 Does this paragraph list the assumptions upon which the concept of operations and logistic support are based?

0 Responsibilities:

00 Are responsibilities for support clearly stated for the following:

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)?

U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM)?

Joint Deployment Agency (JDA)?

Special Operations Forces (SOF)?

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)?

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)?

Unified Commands and their Army Component Commands?

National Guard Bureau (NGB)?

Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR)?

Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)?

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)?

Department of State/American Embassies?

Offices?
Military Groups, Offices of Defense Coordination, Military Liaison

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)?

General Services Administration (GSA)/Federal Supply Service (FSS)?

U.S. Army Troop Support Agency (TSA)?

Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES)?

U.S. Army Health Services Command (HSC)?

U.S. Army Medical Materiel Management Agency (USAMMA)?

U.S. Army Soldier Support Center (SSC)?

Military Airlift Command (MAC):

Military Sealift Command (MSC)?

Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)?

Other Major Commands (MACOMS)?

U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)?

Unit commander providing command and control (Task Force, Brigade, Division)?

Unit or element providing logistic support (Spt Bn, Spt Gp, DISCOM)?

0 Concept of Logistical Support:

00 Does this paragraph describe how supply, maintenance, transportation, and field service support will be provided?

00 Does it specify which logistic elements will provide the support? Are the forces provided adequate? Is there any excess capability?

00 Has the logistics planner developed the support to complement the tactical planning?

00 Have the terrain and enemy intelligence been analyzed to determine the impact on logistic support?

00 Has the deployment flow been properly analyzed to determine the time-phasing for introduction of logistics elements?

00 Has HNS availability and risk been considered?

0 Supply:

00 General:

000 Is the supply system and procedural guidance provided?

000 Is the flow of requisitions described?

000 Is the flow of materiel described?

000 Is a project code required? OSD? JCS? DOD? DA?

000 Is a temporary FAD upgrade required?

000 Are in-country DODAACs required? SSA? Unit level?

000 Are DSS/ALOC procedures described?

000 Are provisions made for contracting, local purchase, and COPARS support?

000 Are the stockage objectives by class of supply specified?

000 Is a known or estimated OST provided?

000 Will automated or nonautomated procedures be used?

000 Do automated systems of supported units and task organized CSS units have interface?

000 Have the interservice support requirements been identified?

000 What support can/will be provided by the host nation (HNS)?

000 What intra-theater support is required?

000 Are retrograde procedures for excess and unserviceable items spelled out?

000 Is the control of Aviation Intensively Managed Items (AIMI) addressed?

000 Are provisions made for emergency resupply?

000 Have Initial Preplanned Supply Support (IPSS) and AMC emergency support packages been considered?

000 Is the communications transceiving capability provided and compatible with the automated systems being deployed?

000 Are changes to the DOD Activity Address File (DODAAF) required such as "ship-to" address?

000 Are some supply support activities to be designated as ALOC? DSS?

000 Are procedures described for cancellation/diversion of materiel inprocess/intransit at the terminal of the operation/exercise?

000 Are provisions made for logistics support of civilians and prisoners of war?

000 Is there covered storage in the area of operations to protect supplies from the elements? If not, are shipments packed for outdoor storage?

000 Are material handling equipment (MHE) requirements provided?

000 Is sufficient rigging material available for airdrop?

000 Has the Army Air Clearance Authority (ACA) been advised of cargo tonnage projected for movement through the designated APOE?

000 Is the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS) aware of the communications routing identifier (COMMRI) and DODAAC to be used for processing direct requisitions and direct supply status?

000 Have distribution procedures for maps been addressed?

00 Class I and Water:

000 Are the ration cycles described by phase?

000 Are fresh eggs, fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats, juices, UHT milk, and canned soft drink supplements to the MRE, T, and B ration meals considered?

000 Do local fresh fruits and vegetables meet US standards?

000 Have unitized operational rations been considered for ease of handling and accountability?

000 Are cash meal payment procedures established?

000 What method of distribution will be used? Unit distribution? Supply Point?

000 Are bakery supplements to MRE, T, and B ration meals considered?

000 Are veterinary personnel adequate for the subsistence support requirements?

000 Are hospital rations addressed?

000 Are chill and freeze reefer requirements for unit dining facilities and Class I supply point (SUPPT) addressed?

000 Is a ration cycle proposed?

000 Are water support requirements satisfied?

- Are the sources of water fresh, brackish, or salty?
(Data is available from Division/Corps Terrain Teams)

- Is the source of water local systems, surface, or wells?

- What type of water purification unit (WPU) is required?
Erdlator? ROWPU?

- Are chillers required?

- What is the water planning factor in gallons/man/day?

- What are the treatment/storage/distribution/cooling requirements? Are they satisfied by deploying unit capability?

- What are the well drilling requirements? Are there any existing wells? What is the quality of water from existing wells?

000 Are potable ice considerations covered? What is requirement planning factor? Have the medical planners provided for certification of ice as potable?

00 Class II:

000 Are requirements for individual clothing, CTA 50-900 items, and mission essential consumables addressed?

000 Have provisions been made for the replacement of damaged personal clothing and chemical protective clothing?

000 Which Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) listing will be used as the basis for the Class II stockage?

000 How will the logistic support element replenish Organizational Clothing Items and Equipment (OCIE) and SSSC items?

000 Are there any items that require special consideration?

Tentage? Tentage repair kits?

Folding cots?

Insect bars with mosquito netting?

Banding material and tools?

Water purification chemicals? Test kits?

Insect repellent? Sun screen?

Field laundry/bath supplies? Hospital laundry supplies?

Dining facility supplies? Paper and plastic products?

Trash disposal supplies?

Vector control equipment and supplies?

Latrine chemicals/supplies?

Batteries?

Cold weather clothing? Cold weather equipment?

00 Class III:

000 Are the Service(s) requirements by location in gal/day for each type product established?

000 Is the use of contractor provided bulk fuels considered?

000 Are ordering/accountable officer requirements addressed?

000 Are existing pipeline distribution systems available? What are the pipeline/storage capabilities?

- 000 Are remote refueling sites required? What capabilities?
- 000 Are interservice support billing and reimbursement procedures specified?
- 000 Are QAR responsibilities established?
- 000 Are POL quality surveillance procedures specified? Are required test kits on hand?
- 000 Is there a petroleum laboratory available?
- 000 Are additives required for commercial fuels? Who will provide?
- 000 Are any unique package product requirements addressed?
- 000 Are AOAP laboratories addressed?
- 000 Are industrial gasses addressed?
- 000 Have JP4 requirements for medical units been considered?

00 Class IV:

- 000 Are unique requirements for construction/security materiel addressed?
- 000 Is in-country procurement considered?
- 000 Have Army Class IV data sources been queried on pre-existing data bases/studies describing locally available construction materiel?
- 000 Are basic loads to be deployed?
- 000 Do the non-engineer units have basic loads? Will they be deployed?
- 000 Will the use of prepositioned materiel stocks be permitted?

00 Class V:

- 000 Is UBL deployment adequately addressed?
- 000 Is the logistic support structure prescribed?
- 000 Have EOD assignments been considered in training personnel and equipment?

- 000 Are EOD support procedures addressed?
- 000 Are there special/unique requirements (Flares/Mines/Demolition)?
- 000 Has site improvement and/or construction of ammunition storage facilities been included in the engineer planning?
- 000 Have the storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety requirements been reviewed and addressed in the planning?
- 000 Are requirements identified by category of munition?
- 000 Are sustaining rates of munitions addressed?
- 000 Are special permits needed/provided for?
- 000 Have unit configured loads been considered?
- 00 Class VI:
 - 000 Are the deploying personnel provided guidance on personal demand items?
 - 000 Are sundry packs available?
 - 000 Is Indirect or Direct Exchange Support considered?
 - 000 If TFE support is required:
 - 0000 Has Headquarters AAFES (Plans) been notified?
 - 0000 Has the TFE staffing, stock assortment, security, facility, transportation, and communications requirements been identified and coordinated?
 - 0000 Is finance support for the TFE identified?
 - 0000 Has the policy on rationing and check cashing been determined?
- 00 Class VII:
 - 000 Does the plan specify the equipment level for deploying units?
 - 000 Are equipment redistribution requirements specified?
 - 000 Are replacement actions for salvage equipment specified?

- 000 Are special equipment requirements addressed?
- 000 Are operational readiness float (ORF)/MEI requirements addressed?
- 00 Class VIII:
 - 000 Are procedures unique to medical supply described?
 - 000 Does this portion of the logistics support plan complement the medical support plan?
 - 000 Are resupply procedures established?
 - 000 Are MPL/PLL requirements specified?
 - 000 Are ASL objectives addressed?
 - 000 Are maintenance exchange and MEDSTEP addressed?
 - 000 Are special medical equipment and supply requirements identified based on medical mission and the area of operations?
 - 000 Are special storage requirements satisfied?
 - 000 Is the disposal of salvage medical supplies addressed?
 - 000 Are medical oxygen and other medical gases requirements, such as anesthesia, identified and resupply procedures established?
 - 000 Is local purchase an option?
- 00 Class IX:
 - 000 Are PLL requirements specified?
 - 000 Are ASL requirements, including reparables, specified?
 - 000 Are cannibalization procedures addressed?
 - 000 Are requirements for special nonexpendable components addressed?
 - 000 Will the GS base support the Class IX supply system?
 - 000 What are the AIMI requirements and procedures?
 - 000 Is a stockage of major assemblies addressed?
 - 000 Have special storage requirements been addressed for dry batteries, classified repair parts, high dollar pilferables, etc...?

000 Is disposal of hazardous materials such as lithium batteries and radioactive residue specified?

00 Class X:

000 If Class X materials are required, does the plan describe the source?

000 What is the source of funding for Class X supplies?

0 Maintenance:

00 Does the plan describe how unit, intermediate (direct support), and intermediate (general support) maintenance will be performed?

00 Is missile maintenance support available in the area of operations?

00 Is Mission Essential Maintenance Only (MEMO) considered?

00 Are special medical maintenance requirements addressed?

00 Are AVIM/AVUM aspects addressed?

00 Does the plan cover TMDE repair and calibration?

00 Are procedures for AOAP specified?

00 Does the plan address equipment classification?

00 Are there provisions for AMC LAR support?

00 Is maintenance exchange addressed?

00 Have extreme weather aspects been considered (e.g., heat, cold, humidity, dust, etc.)?

00 Are site security and storage requirements identified and included in Engineer plans?

00 Are special power requirements for maintenance facilities identified (e.g., voltage, phase, frequency, stability, and anticipated load in KW)?

00 Are building suitability screening factors identified by type of maintenance facility (e.g., minimum height and width for doors, floor load bearing requirements, environmental control necessities, etc.)?

00 Is operational readiness float/MEI addressed?

00 How will repairs under warranty be performed in the area of operations?

00 Is the evacuation of unserviceable reparables addressed?

00 Have procedures for replacing maintenance tools and equipment been specified?

0 Transportation:

00 General:

000 Is there a requirement for the area oriented depot to arrange for SAAM to expedite cargo distribution to the area of operations?

000 Are the transportation support systems for DSS/ALOC described?

000 Does the deploying force have the authorized, assigned and available trained personnel and equipment to accomplish its mission?

000 Do the deploying forces require augmentation?

000 What are SLOC requirements? Can containers be used with carrier delivery direct to SSA?

000 What type and number of terminal transfer units will be required (rail, highway, port, airfield)?

000 Is Coastal Line of Communication (COASTLOC) required? Army Freight Ship? Landing Craft? Lighterage?

000 Are there coastal restrictions?

000 Will a Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) operation be required?

000 Have material handling equipment (MHE) requirements been addressed?

000 What ports are available? What is access to/from ports? Is oceanographic data available? What special port clearance requirements apply?

000 Will Engineer Port Construction Company augmentation be required?

000 What airfields can be used? What are their capabilities? Have the DACG/AACG requirements been satisfied?

000 Is there a rail system available? What are schedules and capability?

000 Is the highway net described? What are the capabilities and limitations?

000 Are the transportation movement priority and account codes provided?

000 What is the weather impact on ports, airfields, and highway nets?

000 What is the availability of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data/analysis regarding the country/area transportation infrastructure?

000 What are the transportation funding arrangements?

000 Are transportation account codes (TAC) requirements specified?

000 Are in-country highway, rail, air, and inland waterway mode requirements addressed?

000 Are the SPOD/SPOE and APOD/APOE specified?

000 Is a movement system for personnel and cargo specified? Intra-theater, Inter-theater? In-country?

000 Has coordination been made with MTMC, MSC, and MAC for personnel and equipment movements?

000 Has a MAC SAAM validating headquarters been specified?

000 Has the use of foreign flag sea/airlift been addressed?

000 Is a cut-off date for changes to AUL/AUEL specified?

000 Will an MCC/JMCC be deployed?

000 Are there any special transportation requirements? Army aircraft to self deploy for example?

000 Are procedures for shipping supplies and equipment that arrive at home station after the unit(s) have deployed addressed?

000 What support can/will be provided by the host nation (HNS)?

000 Have medical evacuation requirements been included in the planning?

00 Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS):

000 What shorelines are conducive for LOTS Operations?

000 What are the characteristics of the shorelines?

000 What type of roads access the shorelines?

000 What type of railroad access the shorelines?

000 What contract civilian/host nation personnel, equipment assets, and repair facilities are available to assist in LOTS Operations?

00 Inland Waterways:

000 What inland waterways are available?

000 What are the characteristics of the inland waterways?

000 What inland terminals are along the waterways?

000 What are the characteristics and capabilities of the inland terminals?

000 What is the present usage of the inland waterways?

000 What is the enemy's capability to interdict the inland waterways?

000 What effect does the weather have on the inland waterways?

000 How accessible are the inland waterways to roads and rail lines?

000 What are the capabilities and limitations of the inland waterways?

00 Intercoastal Shipping:

000 What intercoastal shipping assets are available to support military operations?

000 What intercoastal shipping routes are currently in use?

000 What is the enemy's ability to interdict intercoastal shipping?

00 Containers:

000 What is the container policy?

000 What contract civilian/host nation personnel and equipment assets are available to assist intermodal operations?

000 What is the capability of units to handle container shipments?

000 What is the capability of ports to handle containers?

00 Fixed Ports:

000 What fixed ports are available to support military marine terminal operations?

000 What are the characteristics and capabilities of the fixed ports?

000 What type and quantities of Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) are available for use in support of military marine terminal operations?

000 How many berths and anchorages will be available for use in support of military marine terminal operations?

000 What is the enemy's capability to interdict the ports?

000 What kind of port security measures are currently in use?

000 What is the port's capability to handle containerized cargo?

000 What is the port's capability to handle roll on/roll off (RORO) cargo?

000 What routes access the ports? Is oceanographic data available? Are there any special port clearance requirements?

000 What land routes and inland waterways access the port?

000 What is the current throughput capability of the port?

000 What are the characteristics and capabilities of the port's warehouse facilities and storage area?

000 What effect does weather and the sea have on port operations?

000 What contract civilian/host nation marine terminal personnel and equipment assets are available to support military terminal operations?

000 What is the present level of usage of the ports?

000 What capability does the government/local civilian contractors have to repair damage to port facilities?

00 Airfields:

000 What airfields are available to support military operations?

000 Has a coordinating headquarters been designated for all logistical airlift support?

000 Has support been planned for USAF Mobile Aero-medical Staging Facilities?

000 What are the personnel and cargo reception capabilities of the airfield?

000 What is the current usage of the airfield?

000 What are the characteristics and capabilities of the roads that access the airfield?

000 What contract civilian/host nation personnel and equipment assets are available to assist in Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group Operations (A/DACG)?

000 Has a military organization been specified for A/DACG?

000 What airfield facilities are available for military use during A/DACG Operations?

000 What is the best source for additional information on the airfields?

000 What impact does weather have on airfield operations?

000 Have the Military Airlift Command (MAC) channel airlift requirements been specified?

00 Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and Alternate Supply Routes (ASRs):

000 What are the convoy restrictions?

000 What routes are available to support military operations?

000 What are the most likely routes fleeing refugees would use?

000 What are the characteristics and capabilities of the routes available to support military operations?

000 What are the dimensions of tunnels along the routes?

000 What are the dimensions and classifications of bridges along the routes?

000 What capability does the government have to repair damaged segments of routes?

000 What segments of the routes are heavily used by the civilian populace?

000 What is the best source for additional information on the routes?

00 Rail:

000 What rail lines are available to support military operations?

000 What is the gauge of the tracks?

000 What effect does the weather have on rail operations?

000 What rail assets will be available to support military operations?

000 What is the condition of the rail lines?

000 What is the enemy's ability to interdict the rail lines?

000 What capability does the government or local civilian contractors have to repair damaged track, bridges, and tunnels?

000 What are the characteristics and capabilities of the rail terminals and marshalling yard?

000 What is the present level of usage of the rail lines?

000 What is the description (Model No., wheel arrangement, horsepower, weight, tractive effort, and type coupler) of typical line haul locomotives and switch engines currently in service in the area of operations?

000 What are the capacities, dimensions (length) and age of typical rolling stock currently in service in the area of operations?

000 Is a track profile of the mainline indicating the location, percent, and length of ruling grade available?

000 Is a plan view showing location and length of minimum radius curves together with any sections of multiple mainline track available?

000 What is the location and length of passing tracks on the mainline?

000 What is the current level of traffic (trains per day) utilizing the mainline in the area of operations?

000 What is the location, type, and capacity of rail yards in the area of operations?

000 What is the number and length of track in each yard?

000 What is the location, description (type, construction, length, clearances, and cooper rating) and condition of rail bridges and tunnels on the mainline?

000 What is the location, description (length, clearances) and condition of railway tunnels on the mainline?

000 What is the location, storage capacity, and condition of locomotive fueling facilities in the area of operations?

000 What is the location and quality of water supply on the mainline?

000 What type of communications and signals are in use for train operation?

000 What is the type and location of the power source required for operation of communications and signal?

000 What is the location, description, and condition of station facilities, supporting the operation of the mainline?

000 Are loading ramps available at rail yards and terminals?

000 What is the location, capacity, and condition of engine houses and car repair shop facilities in the area of operations?

000 What type of wheel bearings are predominantly used on rolling stock?

000 What is the location and availability of spare parts for motive power and rolling stock?

000 What is the location and lifting capacity of railway cranes in the area of operations?

000 What is the weight (lb/yd) of mainline rail and the predominate type of crosstie used in the area of operations?

0 Field Services.

00 Are laundry, bath, and clothing renovation requirements addressed?

00 Is Graves Registration (GRREG), capability provided commensurate with the expected requirement?

00 Are procedures for salvage collection, evacuation, and disposal covered?

00 Are Post Exchange services provided?

00 Is fire protection provided? Aviation? Ammunition? Base camps?

- 00 Are procedures for trash disposal addressed?
- 00 Is mortuary support covered?
- 00 Are food service support procedures covered?
- 00 Are there provisions for local procurement/contracting service?
- 00 Are any airdrop requirements satisfied?
- 00 Are there any LAPES requirements? Other air drop?
- 00 Are field bakery services required? Can the host nation satisfy the requirement?
- 00 Are procedures specified and do units have the equipment necessary for cleaning of equipment for redeployment to meet USDA requirements to enter the CONUS?
- 0 Miscellaneous:
 - 00 Are host country military personnel with experience in U.S. military service schools identified?
 - 00 Have arrangements been made with Customs?
 - 00 Are provisions made for Logistics Status (LOGSTAT) reporting?
 - 00 Is fire protection available/needed?
 - 00 Is delousing support required?
 - 00 Is trash/waste disposal covered?
 - 00 What are the facilities requirements to support the logistics systems? Have these requirements been incorporated into the Engineer planning? Can any of the facility requirements be satisfied by host country facilities?
 - 00 Is site preparation required?
 - 00 What are the funding aspects of logistics support?
 - 000 Have all requirements been costed?
 - 000 Has an Account Processing Code been established?
 - 000 What is the electrical power/cycles of the country? Are transformers required?

00 Are the communications to support logistics operations provided for in the communications planning?

000 Have communication frequencies been cleared with the host country?

00 Are there adequate provisions in the plan for contracting support?

000 Are there provisions for contracting support/local purchase?

000 Have an adequate number of contracting officers with the proper warrant been provided?

000 Is finance support available to the contracting officer?

000 Is adequate legal support available to the contracting officer?

000 Are linguists available to support the contracting/local purchase requirements?

000 Are there provisions in the plan for maneuver/war damage resulting from logistic operations?

000 Are phone books for the country or local area available?

000 Are special Department of Agriculture cleaning requirements for retrograde equipment identified?

00 Are automated logistic systems procedures properly addressed?

000 Have backup master files been established and prepared for shipment separate from the primary master files?

000 Are maintainers, operators, and managers assigned and well trained?

000 Has site selection and preparation for automated equipment considered accessibility, geographical, terrain, and security requirements?

000 Has a Continuity of Operations Plan been established?

000 Are sufficient copies of user manuals on hand and current?

000 Are repair parts on hand and up to required levels for the computer hardware including generators and other subsystems?

000 Have provisions been made for backup support for repair parts, hardware maintenance, and the receipt of software change packages and emergency change messages?

000 Have arrangements been made for telephonic assistance (functional and technical) after deployment?

000 Has coordination been made with the next higher Supply Support Activity (SSA) for catalog update, reconciliation schedule, and loading of supported unit DODAACs?

000 Have details been worked out for transmission of documents to higher echelons?

000 Have appropriate parameter changes been made in the automated system(s)? e.g., M&S, signal and oversea deployment codes?

000 Will customer units require training and are customer user manuals available for automated system support?

APPENDIX G

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Appendix G

USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING ON LOGISTICS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Presented by
Major Mark Costa
U.S. Southern Command

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) KEY CHARACTERISTICS

- A SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT ITSELF
- LIC IS PROLONGED WAR
- LIC FAVORS OFFENSE

- LOGISTICS IN LIC
PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
- HOST COUNTRY PARALLELS INSURGENTS INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
 - BATTLE OF LOGISTICS
 - EACH STRATEGY (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY) REQUIRES LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN

ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICS CONCEPT FOR LIC

- POLICY
- PROCEDURES
- PROGRAMS
- PROCUREMENT

POLICY CHARACTERISTICS

- RECOGNITION THAT LIC IS WAR
 - LIC THREATENS U.S. MAJOR INTERESTS IN THE REGION
 - INTEGRATED STRATEGIES ARE REQUIRED
 - SINGLE DECISIONMAKER FOR STRATEGY EXECUTION
- OR-
- INTEGRATED DECISIONMAKING FOR STRATEGY EXECUTION

PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT POLICY

- CINC STAFF INCLUDES ADVISORS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
- HORIZONTAL VICE VERTICAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION
- AGENCIES/COMMANDS/SERVICES IN SUPPORTING ROLES
- CINC GIVEN AUTHORITY TO TASK ORGANIZE FORCES AS NECESSARY

PROGRAMS REQUIRING CINC INPUT/DIRECTION/CONTROL

<u>INPUT</u>	<u>DIRECTION</u>	<u>CONTROL</u>
ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS	SECURITY ASSISTANCE	MESAR
	SERVICE UNIQUE SYSTEMS	

CINC'S AUTHORITY TO PROCURE

- WHAT IS NEEDED BY THE COUNTRY WHEN IT IS NEEDED
- PROCUREMENT OF ALL RESOURCES:
 - EQUIPMENT PERSONNEL
 - SUPPLIES SERVICES
- CINC THE FOCAL POINT FOR:
 - REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
 - APPROVAL
 - EXECUTION
 - ACCOUNTING

SOUTHCOM STRATEGY GOALS IN LIC

- DEVELOP STRONG PROFESSIONAL APOLITICAL HOST COUNTRY ARMED FORCES
- COMPLEMENT HOST COUNTRY INITIATIVES
- PROVIDE CS/CSS TO HOST COUNTRY AS NEEDED DURING CRISIS AND WAR
- TARGET MARCO TRAFFICKING
- LAST RESORT--U.S. COMBAT FORCES

SOUTHCOM PLANNING PROCESS

- TRI-LEVEL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT/MONITORING PROCESS
- OPERATIONAL PLANNING GROUP (OPG)
- TASK FORCE
- COMBINED PLANNING COMMISSION (CPC)

Appendix H

FACT SHEET ON USSOUTHCOM PLANNING GROUP PROCESS

FACT SHEET

30 January 1987
Maj COSTA/4375
SCJ4-LPP

SCJ4

SUBJECT: USSOUTHCOM Planning Group Process for El Salvador and Honduras

PURPOSE: To summarize the functions and responsibilities of the different planning groups for El Salvador and Honduras.

FACTS:

1. The countries of El Salvador and Honduras have three (3) separate USSOUTHCOM planning groups assigned, they are; the Operational Planning Group (OPG), the Task Force, and the Combined Planning Commission (CPC).
2. The OPG monitors a range of country specific initiatives of concern to USSOUTHCOM and its components.
 - a. Membership of the OPG may include the USSOUTHCOM staff, component staff, and USASAALA. Normally, action officer level, attendance at OPG meetings may include director level participation, CINC's designated flag officer representative, or the CINC.
 - b. The OPG develops and reviews the proposed agenda for the CPC.
 - c. OPG's meet on a regular basis, at least quarterly and at times monthly, depending upon the situation in the country.
3. The Task Force is the meeting of the CINC, his primary staff, component commanders and the MILGP commander.
 - a. The purpose of the Task Force may vary from reviewing the results of the last CPC and planning the next, to discussing specific issues and topics of concern to the commanders.
 - b. The Task Force meets irregularly due to its reliance on the availability of the commanders. Preparation for the CPC does not rely upon the meeting of the Task Force.
 - c. In the case of Honduras, the Commander JTF-B attends the meeting.
4. The CPC is the centerpiece of the planning group process for each country. During the CPC the CINC and selected staff meet with the country team and the host country's government and military leadership.
 - a. Composition of the CINC's entourage depends upon the CPC agenda.
 - b. Open and closed sessions are usually conducted. The CINC and the host country's political and military leadership meet in closed session.
 - c. CPC's are normally scheduled on a quarterly basis.

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: USSOUTHCOM Planning Group Process for El Salvador and Honduras

5. The country officer from SCJ5-PM coordinates all three planning groups.
6. The OPG -Task Force- CPC process for Honduras and El Salvador are similar, but have met with different degrees of success.
7. The OPG -Task Force- CPC process has proved to be a successful method for developing, implementing, and monitoring a strategy for a particular country.

Appendix I

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SECTION
OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT



NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

THE WHITE HOUSE
JANUARY 1987

"Freedom, peace and prosperity...
that's what America is all
about...for ourselves, our friends,
and those people across the globe
struggling for democracy."

Ronald Reagan

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Conflict in the Third World can pose serious threats to U.S. security interests. Low Intensity Conflicts, which take place at levels below conventional war but above the routine, peaceful competition among states, can be particularly troublesome. They often involve a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflicts may be waged by a combination of means, including the use of political, economic, informational, and military instruments. They are often localized, but can have significant regional and global security implications.

Major causes of Low Intensity Conflict are instability and lack of political and economic development in the Third World (though Low Intensity Conflict can occur in areas outside the Third World as well). These conditions provide fertile ground for unrest and for groups and nations wishing to exploit unrest for their own purposes. The resulting conflicts are of concern to the United States when they assault U.S. national interests and the security, values, or political foundations of the United States, our friends, and allies. Low Intensity Conflict can gradually isolate the United States, its allies, and major trading partners from the Third World and from each other. This isolation can be manifest in economic, political, and military terms.

Specifically, Low Intensity Conflict can lead to:

- Interruption of Western access to vital resources.
- Gradual loss of U.S. military basing and access rights.
- Expanded threats to key sea lines of communication.
- Gradual shifting of allies and trading partners away from the United States into positions of accommodation with hostile interests.
- Expanded opportunities for Soviet political and military gains.

An effective U.S. response to this form of warfare requires the national will to sustain long-term commitments. The United States has addressed the manifestations of Low Intensity Conflict through a tough counter-terrorism policy; support for democratic resistance movements; and political, economic, and military assistance to developing nations to help them prevent or combat low intensity challenges.

U.S. policy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflict situations may be summarized as follows: *When it is in U.S. interest to do so, the United States:*

- Will take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by systematically employing, in coordination with friends and allies, the full range of political, economic, informational, and military instruments of power. Where possible, action will be taken before instability leads to violence.
- Will work to ameliorate the underlying causes of instability and conflict in the Third World by pursuing foreign assistance, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of democratic social and political orders.
- May support selected resistance movements acting in opposition to regimes working against U.S. interests. Such support will be coordinated with friends and allies and may contain political, informational, economic, and military elements.
- Will take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability in the Third World.

The Low Intensity Conflict strategies that support these policies must coordinate the use of a variety of policy instruments among U.S. Government agencies and internationally. Responses may draw on economic, political, and informational tools, as well as military assistance.

Economic Policy and Low Intensity Conflict. U.S. policy for Low Intensity Conflict recognizes that long term political and economic development will reduce the underlying causes of instability of the Third World, help undermine the attractiveness of totalitarian regimes, and eventually lead to conditions favorable to

U.S. and Western interests. Therefore, we will encourage expansion of free trade, the development of private enterprise, and the expansion and independence of local economies. U.S. development assistance and economic aid programs facilitate these policies. In addition, we will encourage private investment in the Third World when that investment supports balanced economic growth.

Informational Policy and Low Intensity Conflict. Low Intensity Conflict is a political struggle in which ideas may be as important as arms. We hold significant advantages over our adversaries in this area. In contrast to our adversaries, we have an open political system that thrives on communication and truth. We must ensure, however, that accurate information concerning American ideals and objectives is available throughout the Third World; and that the resources needed to accomplish this are available.

Political Instruments and Low Intensity Conflict. We recognize that other nations may not necessarily develop along democratic lines identical to ours. Nevertheless, we seek to encourage the development of political systems that protect the rights of the individual and provide for representative government, free institutions, and an environment in which human dignity can flourish. We do this partially by example, and by defending our own ideals when they are challenged. We can also promote development of humane social orders by helping eliminate security threats and the underlying economic causes of unrest and instability.

Military Instruments in Low Intensity Conflict. The fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflict directed against our friends and allies is that military institutions in threatened states must become able to provide security for their citizens and governments. U.S. Low Intensity Conflict policy, therefore, recognizes that indirect—rather than direct—applications of U.S. military power are the most appropriate and cost effective ways to achieve national goals. The principal military instrument in Low Intensity Conflict, therefore, is security assistance.

The primary role for U.S. armed forces in Low Intensity Conflict is to support and facilitate the security assistance program. The military services must also stand ready to provide more direct forms of military assistance when called upon. Usually, this assistance

will consist of technical training and logistical support. The services and the Unified Commands must also be prepared for the effective execution of contingency and peacekeeping operations when such operations are required to protect national interests. U.S. combat forces will be introduced into Low Intensity Conflict situations only as a last resort and when vital national interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected.

Narcotics Trafficking and Low Intensity Conflict.

Narcotics trafficking can breed violence, fuel instability and threaten governing institutions wherever it is found. The vast revenues produced by illegal narcotics sales, and concomitant use of international financial networks to launder the proceeds of these transactions, can promote the type of instability that becomes a breeding ground for Low Intensity Conflict. For these reasons, our policies for dealing with drug trafficking provide important support for our efforts to deal with Low Intensity Conflict.

Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict. Under some circumstances, terrorism can be an important aspect of Low Intensity Conflict. This Administration has taken

significant steps to define and implement policies to counter international terrorism. These policies focus on deterring, pre-empting and effectively reacting to international terrorist incidents. Low Intensity Conflict policy goes beyond this, however, and deals with the broader problem of supporting groups and governments against which terrorism is being used as a subversive weapon.

We must realize that Low Intensity Conflicts are frequently protracted struggles. In addition, most of the instruments of power that we can bring to bear on them work indirectly and over a long period of time. Therefore, we must be patient in such struggles. It is important that we prevail, but especially important that we recognize that we often cannot do so easily or quickly. On the other hand, we do hold important advantages. We represent a model of political and economic development that promises freedom from political domination and economic privation. If we can protect our own security, and maintain an environment of reasonable stability and open trade and communication throughout the Third World, political, economic, and social forces will eventually work to our advantage.

Appendix J

EXTRACT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 1987

PUBLIC LAW 99-661 [S. 2638]; November 14, 1986

**NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1987**

*For Legislative History of Act see Report for P.L. 99-661
in Legislative History Section, post.*

An Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for each fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to improve the defense acquisition process, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SEC. 1311. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

(a) **ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.**—Section 136(b) of title 10, United States Code (as amended by section 106 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(4) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. He shall have as his principal duty the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special operations activities (as defined in section 167(j) of this title) and low intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense.”

(b) **UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND.**—(1) Chapter 6 of such title (as added by section 211 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433)) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"§167. Unified combatant command for special operations forces

"(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of this title a unified combatant command for special operations forces (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 'special operations command'). The principal function of the command is to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions.

"(b) **ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES.**—Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the special operations command.

"(c) **GRADE OF COMMANDER.**—The commander of the special operations command shall hold the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral while serving in that position, without vacating his permanent grade. The commander of such command shall be appointed to that grade by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for service in that position.

"(d) **COMMAND OF ACTIVITY OR MISSION.**—(1) Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.

"(2) The commander of the special operations command shall exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

"(e) **AUTHORITY OF COMBATANT COMMANDER.**—(1) In addition to the authority prescribed in section 164(c) of this title, the commander of the special operations command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, all affairs of such command relating to special operations activities, including the following functions:

- "(A) Developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics.
- "(B) Training assigned forces.
- "(C) Conducting specialized courses of instruction for commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
- "(D) Validating requirements.
- "(E) Establishing priorities for requirements.
- "(F) Ensuring combat readiness.
- "(G) Developing and acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment and acquiring special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services.
- "(H) Ensuring the interoperability of equipment and forces.
- "(I) Formulating and submitting requirements for intelligence support.
- "(J) Monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations forces officers.

"(2) The commander of such command shall be responsible for monitoring the preparedness of special operations forces assigned to other unified combatant commands to carry out assigned missions.

"(f) **BUDGET.**—In addition to the activities of a combatant command for which funding may be requested under section 166(b) of this title, the budget proposal of the special operations command shall include requests for funding for—

"(1) development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment; and

"(2) acquisition of other material, supplies, or services that are peculiar to special operations activities.

"(g) INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES.—This section does not constitute authority to conduct any activity which, if carried out as an intelligence activity by the Department of Defense, would require—

"(1) a finding under section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422); or

"(2) a notice to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives under section 801(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413).

"(h) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations for the activities of the special operations command. Such regulations shall include authorization for the commander of such command to provide for operational security of special operations forces and activities.

"(i) IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), for the purposes of this section special operations forces are those forces of the armed forces that—

"(A) are identified as core forces or as augmenting forces in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex E, dated December 17, 1985;

"(B) are described in the Terms of Reference and Conceptual Operations Plan for the Joint Special Operations Command, as in effect on April 1, 1986; or

"(C) are designated as special operations forces by the Secretary of Defense.

"(2) The Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of the special operations command, may direct that any force included within the description in paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) shall not be considered as a special operations force for the purposes of this section.

"(j) SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES.—For purposes of this section, special operations activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations:

"(1) Direct action.

"(2) Strategic reconnaissance.

"(3) Unconventional warfare.

"(4) Foreign internal defense.

"(5) Civil affairs.

"(6) Psychological operations.

"(7) Counterterrorism.

"(8) Humanitarian assistance.

"(9) Theater search and rescue.

"(10) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense."

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"167. Unified combatant command for special operations forces."

(c) MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM CATEGORY.—The Secretary of Defense shall create for the special operations forces a major force program category for the Five-Year Defense Plan of the Department of

Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, with the advice and assistance of the commander of the special operations command, shall provide overall supervision of the preparation and justification of program recommendations and budget proposals to be included in such major force program category.

(d) **PROGRAM AND BUDGET EXECUTION.**—To the extent that there is authority to revise programs and budgets approved by Congress for special operations forces, such authority may be exercised only by the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the commander of the special operations command.

(e) **GRADE FOR COMMANDERS OF CERTAIN AREA SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS.**—The commander of the special operations command of the United States European Command, the United States Pacific Command, and any other unified combatant command that the Secretary of Defense may designate for the purposes of this section shall be of general or flag officer grade.

(f) **BOARD FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.**—Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(f) The President shall establish within the National Security Council a board to be known as the ‘Board for Low Intensity Conflict’. The principal function of the board shall be to coordinate the policies of the United States for low intensity conflict.”

(g) **DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.**—It is the sense of Congress that the President should designate within the Executive Office of the President a Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to be the Deputy Assistant for Low Intensity Conflict.

(h) **REPORTS.**—(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the plans of the Secretary for implementation of this section, including a description of the progress made on such implementation.

(2) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a report on the capabilities of the United States to conduct special operations and engage in low intensity conflicts. The report shall include a description of the following:

- (A) Deficiencies in such capabilities.
- (B) Actions being taken throughout the executive branch to correct such deficiencies.
- (C) The principal low intensity conflict threats to the interests of the United States.
- (D) The actions taken and to be taken to implement this section.

(i) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—Section 167 of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (b)), shall be implemented not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(j) **FUNDING FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987.**—The Secretary of Defense may spend unobligated funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal years before fiscal year 1987 in such sums as necessary in order to carry out this section and section 167 of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (b)), during fiscal year 1987.

Appendix K

DOD REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS REORGANIZATION

Provided by
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
February 1987

Secretary of Defense
Report to Congress
on Special Operations Reorganization

In an amendment to Section 106 of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress provided for a restructuring of DOD components involved in special operations and low-intensity conflict. Said amendment dictated a status report on February 16, 1987. Accordingly, this report provides a description of progress made toward and plans for implementation of this section of the Act.

I. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict--ASD(SO/LIC)

We are establishing the ASD(SO/LIC) who will be responsible for overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special operations (SO) and low-intensity conflict (LIC) activities within the Department of Defense. The ASD(SO/LIC) will report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

There will be a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) who will be the principal staff assistant to the ASD, will act for him in his absence, and will be specifically responsible for overall integration of the activities of the subordinate components.

The Office of the ASD(SO/LIC) will be organized into three functional elements, each directed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations will be responsible for the development of DOD policy on special operations and for overseeing implementation of that policy.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Low-Intensity Conflict will be responsible for development of DOD policy on LIC and for overseeing implementation of that policy.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resources will be responsible for overall supervision of resources related to special operations and LIC. This will include overall supervision of the preparation and justification of program and budget proposals to be included in FYDP Program 11 for SOF and review of USSOC proposals for the development and acquisition of equipment, other material, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations. Oversight of RD&A activities will be accomplished within the newly developed structure and charter of the USD(Acquisition).

II. FYDP Program 11

We are creating a major force program category within the Five-Year Defense Plan for Special Operations Forces (FYDP Program 11). This program will consolidate SOF unique funding currently displayed in FYDP Program 2 (General Purpose Forces) and other programs, and will include the USSOC budget as well as other SOF resources contributed by the Services and Defense Agencies.

III. The Position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

While this amendment specifies creation of the ASD(SO/LIC), Title 10 restricts DOD to eleven ASD positions, all of which are currently encumbered or designated. Therefore, we request that Congress amend Title 10 to authorize a total of twelve ASD positions. Until authorization for this position is obtained, the direction and development of this new DOD entity will be under the cognizance and direction of the PDASD(ISA).

Oversight of special operations and low-intensity conflict will be quite demanding and we are proceeding very deliberately in reviewing the qualifications of a number of candidates for the position of ASD(SO/LIC). The interview process by the Deputy Secretary of Defense has begun. It is expected that this process will be completed in the near future and our nomination will be submitted to the Senate.

IV. Organizational Progress

We are providing substantial staff expansion to enhance our management capability of these important activities and have begun the process of bringing new personnel on board. We have also identified physical facilities to accommodate the new Assistant Secretary and subordinate staff elements.

V. Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations

The referenced legislation requires that the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish a unified combatant command for Special Operations Forces. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to recommend to the Secretary of Defense the disestablishment of US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) to provide billets and facilities for US Special Operations Command (USSOC). USREDCOM missions would be transferred to other commands. The deactivation of USREDCOM and activation of USSOC will require detailed implementation plans. A plan to initiate the required actions includes dates for the activation of USSOC not later than 16 April 1987. The President must approve the changes to the unified command plan (UCP) related to these actions.

Forming USSOC via this process achieves the earliest operational date for the USSOC. Utilization of the USREDCOM headquarters facilities at MacDill Air Force Base avoids an approximate two year delay and the expense of programming for and building a headquarters facility for the command. It should also be noted that MacDill Air Force Base has excellent airfield facilities and convenient access to most assigned forces.

VI. Assignment of Forces

With the exception of the Naval Special Warfare Groups, all SOF stationed in the United States will be assigned to USSOC, including the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Command and control of JSOC for contingency operations will be directed by the NCA. The component forces of USSOC will comprise Army Special Forces, Ranger, and Special Operations Aviation units in addition to the Special Warfare Center and School; Air Force C-130 Combat Talon, HH-53 Pave Low, AC-130 gunships, Combat Control, Special Operations School, and other related units; and the Naval Special Warfare Center. Naval Special Warfare Groups currently assigned to the US Atlantic Command and US Pacific Command will remain assigned to their respective CINCS. Reserve Component SOF, except those reserve units which mobilize to Naval Special Warfare Groups, will also be assigned to USSOC to enhance their preparation to support the regional unified commanders.

VII. Command Activity

The charter for USSOC will describe the USSOC mission, functions, and responsibilities. The principal function of USSOC will be to prepare Special Operations Forces to carry out assigned missions. USSOC responsibilities in support of that principal function will be detailed in the charter, including: development of special operations strategy, doctrine, and tactics; special operations training; validating requirements and establishing priorities within the planning, programming, and budgeting system; formulating and submitting requirements for intelligence support; and monitoring promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations personnel.

VIII. Commander

Upon approval to establish USSOC, the position of Commander in Chief (USCINCSOC), grade O-10, nominative from all four Services, will be established. The USSOC headquarters joint manpower program (JMP) is being developed at an initial level of 250 persons, following a standard joint headquarters structure. Any future requirements for additional manning would be submitted, with justification, by USCINCSOC for review and approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

IX. General/Flag Officer Grade for the Commanders of
the Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)
and Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC)

The special operations legislation requires that the commanders of SOCEUR and SOCPAC be of general or flag officer grade. The Joint Staff has requested recommendations from USCINCEUR and USCINCPAC on the grade and Service of the commanders of SOCEUR and SOCPAC. In making their determination, USCINCEUR and USCINCPAC are defining the responsibilities of their respective SOC commanders, commensurate with the recommended grade. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will review, for approval, the recommendations for the new general officer command positions by mid-March 1987.

Appendix L

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT GAMING SYSTEM FOR NDU

Briefing presented by
E. A. (Sasha) Taurke
Wargaming and Simulation Center
National Defense University

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT Gaming System for the

War Gaming & Simulation Center
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

CONTRACTOR: BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON

Sponsors
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• NDU WGSC• COTR: Erwin A. Taurke -- (202) 475-2105• US SOUTHCOM (SWORD)

BASIC ASSUMPTION

**LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT CAN BE DESCRIBED
AS AN INTERACTION OF CONTENDING OR COALESCING**

GROUPS

What is LIC?

- Counterinsurgency
- Peacekeeping
- Peacetime Contingency Operations
- Terrorism Counteraction
- Insurgency
- Terrorism
- Drug Interdiction

Goal: Simulate All Aspects of LIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Seminar Gaming• Tool for Analysis• Flexible• Modular
--	---

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT GAMING SYSTEM

RESOURCES (POWER) CAN SHIFT AS GROUPS SEEK TO:


- MAXIMIZE THEIR OWN POWER
- MINIMIZE POWER OF OPPONENTS

GROUPS GENERALLY ACT IN THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST AS DEFINED BY THEIR OWN

GOALS

SELF-INTEREST LEADS TO CONFLICT OR COALITION BETWEEN GROUPS

GAMING APPROACH ALLOWS GROUPS OF ANALYSTS TO SIMULATE NATIONAL OR REGIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICT AND DEVELOP A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES RATHER THAN A POINT ESTIMATE.



BUILDING A FRAMEWORK

POLITICAL POWER

- DEPENDENT ON ALLOTMENT OF INFLUENCE ASSETS BETWEEN GROUPS
- DEPENDENT ON SKILL IN APPLYING ASSETS
- DEPENDENT ON CERTAIN ATTRIBUTES
 - GROUP AUTONOMY
 - GROUP SOCIAL STRUCTURE
 - GROUP HOMOGENEITY
 - GROUP WILLINGNESS TO APPLY ASSETS
 - GROUP STANDARDS

ASSETS ARE INTEGRATING FACTORS

ASSETS FORM A MEASURE OF GROUP POWER.

ASSETS ARE MODIFIED AND CHANGED THROUGH ACTIONS OF ALL GROUPS.

- ACROSS ALL DIMENSIONS

- EACH DIMENSION CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY

- CONTROLLER CHOOSES ORDER OF ADJUDICATION TO ENSURE PROPER
INTERACTION

-- E.G., FOR MILITARY ACTION, MILITARY DIMENSION WILL BE
CONSIDERED FIRST, THEN OTHERS

ASSETS AND DIMENSIONS ARE INTEGRATED USING POLSTAB FRAMEWORK.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT GAMING SYSTEM

POWER (QUANTIFIED BY ASSETS)

TANGIBLE ASSETS	INTANGIBLE ASSETS
• MANPOWER	• SKILLS
• MONEY	• CHARISMA
• WEAPONS	• IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR
• COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA	• RECTITUDE
• EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS	• LEGITIMACY
• MINOR GROUPS	• RULES OF THE GAMES
• GROUP CHARACTERISTICS	

NOTE: (1) DIFFERENT GROUPS DO NOT WEIGH ASSETS EQUALLY.

(2) GROUPS HAVE DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES.

(3) SUCCESS OR FAILURE BASED ON GROUP OBJECTIVES.

(4) SPECIFIC RULES FOR MANIPULATING ASSETS BASED ON CULTURE, COMMON LANGUAGE AND RELIGION AND ARE, THEREFORE, UNIQUE TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES/REGIONS.


COERCIVE ASSETS

ARMED MANPOWER	- RATIO OF ARMED AND MOBILIZED MEMBERS TO TOTAL ARMED MANPOWER IN SOCIETY
COMMITTED MANPOWER	- RATIO OF FORMAL NON-ARMED GROUP MEMBERS TO TOTAL COMMITTED MANPOWER IN SOCIETY
SUPPORTERS	- RATIO OF NUMBER OF NON-MEMBERS (NOT ARMED, MOBILIZABLE, OR COMMITTED) WHO SHARE AIMS OF GROUP TO TOTAL NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS IN THE SOCIETY
WEAPONS	- RATIO OF NUMBER OF HEAVY AND LIGHT WEAPONS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT, WEIGHTED BY APPROPRIATENESS IN COMBAT, TO TOTAL NUMBER OF WEAPONS IN THE SOCIETY

ECONOMIC ASSETS

- CAPITAL
 - PERCENT OF TOTAL CORPORATE ASSETS (1000 TOP CORPORATIONS) OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY EACH GROUP
- INCOME
 - PERCENT OF TOTAL NET SALES (1000 TOP CORPORATIONS) GENERATED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY EACH GROUP
- JOB
 - PERCENT OF TOTAL NON-AGRICULTURAL JOBS (PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR) CONTROLLED BY EACH GROUP
- AGRICULTURAL ASSETS
 - PERCENT OF TOTAL VALUE OF CROPS CONTROLLED BY EACH GROUP, CORRECTED BY SHARE OF TOTAL NET SALES GENERATED BY EACH OF THESE CROPS
- RULES OF THE ECONOMIC GAME
 - A WEIGHT ASSIGNED TO EACH GROUP IN TERMS OF ITS ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN THE SOCIETY (RANGE FROM 0 TO 1)


LIC GAME DESIGN



Player Decisions

- Allocation of New Resources
- Change Organization (e.g. Commanders, Level of Control)
- Policy Decisions (e.g. Tax Rate, Civil Rights, Ideology)
- Diplomacy (Other Players and Non-Players)
- Position/Status of Assets (e.g. Rules of Engagement, Mission)
- Discrete Actions (At most refined level of simulation)

LIC GAMING SYSTEM STUDY APPROACH



PROJECT: LIC Gaming System


FILE: LICGNEW

LIC Gaming System	Hrs.	Who	1986	1987								1988								
			Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb
Phase 1																				
Work Plan	98	BW BD																	
Research Dimensions	634	BW NY																	
Theoretical Baseline	95	BW BD																	
Approach Methodology	155	NY BE																	
Design Game	310	NK NY																	
Design Modules	158	NY NY																	
Design DBMS	138	BD BW																	
ID Data Reqmts	92	NY BD																	
Phase 2																				
Implementation Plan	106	BW KM							...											
Implement Design	562	BW BD																	
Develop Data Bases	716	BW BD																	
Prepare Deliverables	358	BW BD																	
Pretest Briefing	82	BW BD												...						
Phase 3																				
Develop Test Plan	122	BW BD												...						
Develop Scenario	148	NK NY																	
Test Modules	302	NY NK																	
Test Game	532	NY NK																	
Test Results Briefing	160	BW BD																	
Phase 4																				
Develop Training Plan	120	BW BD																	
Develop Trng Matrix	320	BD NY																	
Conduct Training	284	BD NY																	
Final Report	152	BW BD																	

Appendix M

AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) CONCEPT

Briefing presented by
Lt Col H. T. Hayden
Logistics Plans, Policies, and Strategic Mobility Division
Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps



ARG/MAU (SOC)





FMFLANT STUDY



REQUIREMENT

- THREAT... REVIEW OUR CAPABILITIES AND DETERMINE ACTIONS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE FMF, PROVIDES FLEET COMMANDERS THE CAPABILITY OF FORCE PROJECTION ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF WARFARE, TO INCLUDE SPECIAL OPERATIONS THAT CONFORM TO USMC MISSION
- EXAMINE POTENTIAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE FMF, TO CONDUCT MARITIME-ORIENTED SPECIAL OPERATIONS
- RECOMMENDATION ON THE FORMATION OF FMF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE(S) CAPABLE OF INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS UNDER NAVAL COMMAND OR AS PART OF A NAVAL COMPONENT IN A JOINT OPERATION



LF6F MISSION



AS A CONTINGENT OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, IS TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS OF LIMITED DURATION, ACT AS ADVANCE FORCE FOR A FOLLOW-ON LARGER MAGTF (E.G., MAB FWD) AND TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE CAPABILITY ACROSS A WIDE SPECTRUM OF CRISIS/CONTINGENCY BY CONDUCTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS INCLUDING:

AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS	FIRE SUPPORT CONTROL
SECURITY OPERATIONS	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) OPERATIONS
LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK	INITIAL TERMINAL GUIDANCE
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	ELECTRONIC WARFARE
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)	CLANDESTINE RECOVERY OPERATIONS
SHOW-OF-FORCE OPERATIONS	SPECIALIZED DEMOLITION OPERATIONS
REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS	MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)
CIVIL ACTIONS	TACTICAL RECOVERY A/C AND PERSONNEL (TRAP)
DECEPTION OPERATIONS	IN EXTREMIS HOSTAGE RESCUE



LF6F MISSION



OTHER TASKS WHICH COULD BE ASSIGNED INCLUDE:

- (1) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND SUPPORT OF VARIOUS CONTINGENCY PLANS OF USCINCEUR AND COMMANDER ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE (AFSOUTH)
- (2) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE IN SUPPORT OF USCINCENT IN SOUTHWEST ASIA AS PART OF A COMPOSITE PACOM MAB (3/9 MAF)
- (3) CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS OF CINCLANT DURING TRANSITS



IMPLEMENTATION OF ENHANCED TRAINING PROGRAM



GENERAL

A DETAILED TRAINING PROGRAM, COVERING THE SIX MONTH PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING PERIOD WAS DEVELOPED TO ENSURE THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS READINESS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS.

THIS ENHANCED TRAINING COUPLED WITH THE PROCUREMENT OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT RESULTED IN A QUANTUM JUMP IN THE MAU'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES.



IMPLEMENTATION OF ENHANCED TRAINING PROGRAM



SPINOFFS

**THE ENHANCED TRAINING HAS SIGNIFICANTLY UPGRADED
THE READINESS AND CAPABILITY OF THE ENTIRE NAVY/MARINE
CORPS TEAM IN CONVENTIONAL ROLES AND MISSIONS**

**DEFINITELY HAS INCREASED THE CONFIDENCE LEVEL OF
THE INDIVIDUAL SAILOR AND MARINE**



SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING GOALS

- **AMPHIBIOUS RAID - CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS RAID ON SHORT NOTICE AT NIGHT UNDER EMCON CONDITIONS VIA HELICOPTER AND/OR SURFACE MEANS FROM EXTENDED RANGES IN ORDER TO: INFLECT LOSS OR DAMAGE UPON OPPOSING FORCES; CREATE DIVERSIONS; AND CAPTURE OR EVACUATE INDIVIDUALS AND MATERIAL BY SWIFT INCURSION INTO OR TEMPORARY OCCUPANCY OF AN OBJECTIVE FOLLOWED BY SWIFT WITHDRAWAL**



SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING GOALS



- **NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) -CONDUCT AN EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS IN EITHER NON PERMISSIVE OR PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT TO INCLUDE: PROVIDING A SECURITY FORCE; RIOT CONTROL; SCREENING FORCE; RESCUE FORCE; EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER; MEDICAL SUPPORT TO EVACUEES; AND, TRANSPORT TO THE ATF OR OTHER SAFE HAVEN**



SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING GOALS

- **REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS - CONDUCT REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AT NIGHT BY HELICOPTER AND/OR SURFACE MEANS IN ORDER TO REINFORCE BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND HOST NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES THAT ARE EITHER ORGANIC OR EXTERNAL TO THE MAU. THIS WILL INCLUDE THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT A DOCTRINAL RELIEF IN PLACE OR A PASSAGE OF LINES OPERATION**




SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING GOALS



- **INITIAL TERMINAL GUIDANCE - PROVIDE INITIAL TERMINAL GUIDANCE TO SUPPORT ATF SPECIAL OPERATION MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY HELO, SURFACE, AND/OR FIXED WING ASSETS, OR A COMBINATION THEREOF**



MARITIME SPECIAL PURPOSE RAID/RECOVERY FORCE OPERATIONS




- CLANDESTINE RECOVERY OPERATIONS
- SPECIALIZED DEMOLITION OPERATIONS
- TACTICAL RECOVERY OF A/C AND PERSONNEL (TRAP)
- IN - EXTREMIS HOSTAGE RESCUE



MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (MAU)
(NOTIONAL TASK ORGANIZATION)

APPROX
PERSONNEL
USMC 1900
USN 100



AIRCRAFT/LAUNCHERS 1/

4 CH-53D/E	5 TANKS	8 155MM HOW
12 CH-46	8 81MM MORTARS	9 60MM MORTARS
2 UH-1	32 DRAGON TRACKERS	20 50 CAL MG
4 AH-1	8 TOW LAUNCHERS	60 M-60 MG
5 STINGER TEAMS	12 AAV	26 MK-19 40MM GRENADE LAUNCHERS


MAJOR GROUND COMBAT EQUIPMENT

* ACTUAL TASK ORGANIZATION FORMED TO ACCOMPLISH SPECIFIC MISSIONS
MAY VARY FROM THE ORGANIZATION SHOWN.

1/ THE ACE COULD BE REINFORCED BY 1 VMA DET (6 AV-8) AS THE
TACTICAL SITUATION DICTATES.

MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (MAB)
(NOTIONAL TASK ORGANIZATION)

APPROX
 PERSONNEL
 USMC 15,000
 USN 700




AIRCRAFT/LAUNCHERS 1/		MAJOR GROUND COMBAT EQUIPMENT	
20 AV-8B or 19 A-4M	17 TANKS	24 155 MM HOW (T)	
24 F/A-18 or 24 F-4	24 61MM MORTARS	6 155 MM HOW (SP)	
10 A-6	8 CH-53E	96 DRAGON TRACKERS	6 8" HOW (SP)
4 EA-6	20 CH-53D	48 TOW LAUNCHERS	27 60MM MORTARS
4 RF-4B	48 CH-46	47 AAV	138 50 CAL MG
5 OA-4M	12 UH-1	36 LAV	255 M-60 MG
6 KC-130	12 AH-1		114 MK-19 40MM GRENADE LAUNCHERS
6 OV-10	6 HAWK LAUNCHERS		
	15 STINGER TEAMS		

* ACTUAL TASK ORGANIZATION FORMED TO ACCOMPLISH SPECIFIC MISSIONS MAY VARY FROM THE ORGANIZATION SHOWN.

1/ THE AVIATION FORCE SHOWN, WHEN ADDED TO AN MPS FORCE LIST, EQUALS APPROXIMATELY 1/3 OF THE TOTAL ACTIVE AVIATION FORCE ASSETS. THIS FORCE IS NOT IDEAL (FOR EXAMPLE: 24 ATTACK HELOS ARE THE RECOGNIZED MINIMUM TO PROPERLY SUPPORT A MAB).

**MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (MAF)
(NATIONAL TASK ORGANIZATION)**

APPROX
PERSONNEL
USMC 49,700
USN 2,600



AIRCRAFT/LAUNCHERS 1/		MAJOR GROUND COMBAT EQUIPMENT	
40 AV-8B or	38 A-4M	70 TANKS	90 155MM HOW
48 F/A-18 or	48 F-4	72 81MM MORTARS	18 155MM HOW (SP)
20 A-6	16 CH-53E	288 DRAGON TRACKERS	12 8" HOW (SP)
8 EA-6	32 CH-53D	144 TOW LAUNCHERS	81 60MM MORTARS
8 RF-4B	60 CH-46	208 AAV	435 50 CAL MG
9 TA-4/OA-4	24 UH-1	147 LAV	601 M-60 MG
12 KC-130	24 AH-1		345 HK-19 40MM GRENADE LAUNCHERS
12 OV-10	24 HAWK LAUNCHERS		
	75 STINGER TEAMS		

* ACTUAL TASK ORGANIZATION FORMED TO ACCOMPLISH SPECIFIC MISSIONS MAY VARY FROM THE ORGANIZATION SHOWN.

1/ THE AVIATION FORCE SHOWN EQUALS APPROXIMATELY 1/3 OF THE TOTAL ACTIVE AVIATION FORCE ASSETS. THIS FORCE IS NOT IDEAL (FOR EXAMPLE: 72 ATTACK HELOS ARE THE RECOGNIZED MINIMUM TO PROPERLY SUPPORT A MAF).

Appendix N

ARTICLE ON USMC COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALION

by
Lt Col H. T. Hayden
Logistics Plans, Policies, and Strategic Mobility Division
Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps



The CSS Battalion (Rein)

by LtCol H.T. Hayden

Good morning, Sir. For this morning's briefing on combat service support I will explain how all Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) units will receive logistical and combat service support during all phases of the exercise. As the commanding officer of the 33d Combat Service Support (CSS) Battalion (Rein). I want to assure you that all elements of the battalion (see Figure 1) are prepared to participate in MAGTF logistical/CSS planning and contribute to the commander and staff estimates and final plans.

It is important to point out that the 33d CSS Battalion and its reinforcements have completed a one-year intensive CSS combat skills training program with the Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations Capable). The battalion is fully prepared to provide a continuous flow of supplies, fuel, and equipment, as necessary, to support the combat and combat support elements of the MAU(SOC) during combat operations ashore.

Technical improvements in "logistic over-the-shore" operations and "sea basing" of MAGTF supplies and support service enable the 33d CSS Battalion (Rein) to assume a maneuver unit identity. Inviting static targets, such as combat service support areas and beach support areas, are things of the past. The amphibious ready group ships (e.g. LSD 41 *Whidbey Island* class, LHA *Tarawa* class, and LHD 1 *Wasp* class) with the new high mobility lift platforms (air cushioned landing craft, the CH-53E, and the MV-22A *Osprey*) together with the new ground mobility enhancements (M900 series trucks, logistic vehicle systems) and the field logistic systems that precipitated the creation of the CSS battalion have brought about significant changes in the concepts and functions of CSS.

For those of you who are not familiar with the brains, heart, and soul of a reinforced CSS battalion, let me give a brief description of a tactical logistics operations center (TLOC). The physical makeup of the TLOC varies from three or four high mobility, multipur-

CSS elements, challenged to keep up with emerging MAGTF concepts, have been considering new organizational alignments and operational techniques to provide more responsive support. The following fictional briefing, set in January 1991 aboard the USS Wasp (LHD 1), forecasts some of the changes that may be in the offing.

pose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), during the fluid amphibious assault phase, to three or four general purpose tents during operations ashore. There are three basic modules in the TLOC. The largest module is, of course, the CSS operations center, with the CSS operations officer and the requisite CSS desks covering supply, maintenance, engineer support, motor transport, and other functions. The second module is the CSS intelligence-security center (CSS ISC), with continuous contact with all Marine air-ground intelligence systems and continuous monitoring of CSS security requirements including rear area security of the MAU(SOC). The CSS ISC together with the third module, the CSS fire support coordination center (CSS FS-CC), is capable of conducting offensive and defensive operations to defend the MAU(SOC) rear area.

The logistical focus of effort coincides with the MAU(SOC) commander's focus of main effort. CSS battalion liaison personnel are integrated into the MAU(SOC)s/BLTs combat operations centers (COCs). The wide tactical dispersion required of all MAGTF elements and the high usage and consumption rates anticipated in combat

make it imperative that we do not underestimate initial planning requirements. Additionally, the staffing of the TLOC has been designed to help anticipate the needs of the MAGTF. The reinforced CSS battalion is responsible for a "push-pull" approach. The MAU(SOC) must never be slowed or halted to wait for CSS. Continuous planning by CSS and MAU(SOC) personnel enables them to anticipate required replenishments, and fragmentary orders are issued to the CSS battalion covering "what, where, and when" for all classes of supply. CSS for the MAGTF is active not reactive.

The 33d CSS Battalion has developed a multiple distribution system. Supply point distribution will be in effect for our own units and the air combat element, with the exception of the mobile advanced AV-8B "hot spots" and the helicopter refueling and supply points. Unit distribution will be in effect for those identified combat support units with semifixed base locations. "Logistics hot spot" or "jiffy-mart" will be in effect to support all combat and combat support elements during combat, maneuver, or displacement. The CSS liaison personnel will consolidate all MAU(SOC) logistics




Figure 1

requests and coordinate with the unit S-3 and S-4 to determine the preferred method of distribution, the desired time, and specific quantities of supply and/or service support.

To assist the CSS battalion and provide continuous mobile logistical/CSS support there are a number of concepts that need the full understanding and assistance from the MAGTF. The CSS battalion requires augmentation (see Figure 2) to be an effective force

CSS BATTALION AUGMENTATION

Requirement	Providing Unit
LAV Platoon	LAV Battalion
Firepower Control Team	ANGLICO
Combat Engineer Platoon	Combat Engineer Battalion
Communications Platoon	Communications Battalion

Figure 2

multiplier and contribute to the MAGTF commander's scheme of maneuver:

- Following completion of the amphibious assault and the initial intelligence collection and screening missions given the light armored vehicle (LAV) company, an LAV platoon must be provided to the CSS battalion for security and escort. The significant firepower and antiair capability of the LAV platoon will enhance rear area security.

- A firepower control team (FCT) from the air-naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) will provide the requisite capability of utilizing close air support aircraft, support/attack helicopters, naval gunfire, and artillery through the CSS FSCC.

- Rapid construction of defensive positions around the CSS battalion can only be accomplished with combat engineers. The old defensive concept of erecting time-consuming obstacles, barricades, and minefields is obsolete. Engineers, assigned to the CSS battalion must be able to contribute to our current mobile logistic concepts. Minefields, obstacles, and barricades must be erected and disassembled as activities displace. Immediate construction of CSS facilities requires the support of combat engineers.

- Communication requirements between the MAGTF elements and the reinforced CSS battalion have taken a quantum leap. A communication platoon from the force-level communica-


tions battalion is needed to maintain constant communication with all elements of the MAGTF. At some time in the future, it is envisaged that the Tactical Combat Operations System will display a map overlaid with locations of friendly forces as received from the Position Location Reporting System, as well as with fire control measures and other information, that will enable the CSS battalion to be more supportive of the tactical scheme of maneuver. Combat, combat support, and CSS elements will be able to identify maneuver units, locate combat support firing positions, and determine secure CSS resupply points ("hot spots" or "jiffymarts").

The enhanced capability of the MAU(SOC) to augment/reinforce special operations forces is another challenge for the CSS commander. All CSS Marines must be prepared to join an infantry unit in MAU(SOC) operations. All squad leaders in the landing force support party (LFSP) must attend the infantry squad leader's course.

Separate CSS teams are trained and equipped to accompany all elements of the MAU(SOC). This includes MAU(SOC) enhanced capabilities for amphibious raids, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), etc.

Selected LFSP teams have been formed to accompany amphibious raids, NEO, etc. The LFSP Marines are highly trained to accomplish the CSS mission and to assist, if required, in any MAU(SOC) mission. It is not envisioned, however, that an LFSP team would accompany an amphibious raiding force except in unusual situations.

In the past, Marines have been tasked to carry individual loads of over 100 pounds when moving into combat. Such large cumbersome burdens deprive Marines of an effective fire and maneuver capability. Accordingly, all nonessential combat equipment (e.g., individual packs, sleeping bags, extra rations, etc.) will be loaded with "on-call waves" and be available to commanders at D-2 after D-day objectives have been secured. In this way the CSS battalion can contribute directly to the overall scheme of maneuver by making units more mobile.



In view of the ultra-high threat to command and control headquarters and rear area units from Soviet "forward detachments" or *Spetsnaz*-type units, the MAGTF commander has approved testing a concept in which the "Charlie Command Post" (CP) with the CSS battalion will assume temporary responsibility for fire support coordination. The test will simulate the incapacitation of the Alpha command element and the displacement of the Bravo command element following a massive penetration of the beachhead area by attacking enemy forces. Due to the obvious limitations of the CSS battalion, which preclude a Charlie CP from operating effectively for more than a few hours, the objectives of the Charlie CP are: (1) to maintain communications with the MAU(SOC) CP; (2) to exercise communications with the battalion landing team's (BLTs) maneuver elements; and (3) to pass FSCC information to the MAU(SOC) FSCC. It is planned that the CSS battalion will direct combat operations in defense of the rear area until the BLT COC has resumed full operation.

To conclude, I would like to reflect on the Headquarters Marine Corps decision to change the name of my unit from MSSG-33 to the 33d CSS Battalion, now reinforced for this operation. While CSS commanders have always had the same authority and responsibilities as infantry battalion and aircraft squadron commanders within the MAGTF, they have not had equal stability of units for training and planning and have not been able to develop the CSS capabilities needed to keep pace with MAGTF operational concepts. With the shift to a CSS battalion-regiment structure, many of these deficiencies have been eliminated and CSS is prepared to function as a true "force multiplier." USMC

Appendix 0

INFORMATION SOURCES FOR LOGISTICS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Prepared by
Lt Col William F. Furr
U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC)

NOTE: The CLIC is interested in making this list as comprehensive and current as possible. Updates are solicited; however, copies of these documents are not available from the CLIC.

CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
LOGISTICS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

SUGGESTED READING LIST

ABCA Armies' Combat Development Guide (Up to the Year 2000), Vol I, Chap 5, Low Level Conflict, US Army Training and Doctrine Command/ATDO-A, Ft Monroe, VA, 24 Apr 85. [SECRET]

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Appendix P

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Acronyms used in this report are listed below with their terms.

AALPS	Automated Air Load Planning System
ACA	Airlift Clearance Authority
ACAPS	Army Construction Automated Planning System
A/DACG	Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group
AFCS	Army Facilities Component System
AFLMC	Air Force Logistics Management Center
AFM	Air Force Manual
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
AIMI	Aircraft Intensively Managed Item
ALOC	Air Lines of Communication
ANGLICO	Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO	Area of Operations
AR	Army Regulation
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Alternate Supply Route
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AVIM	Aviation Intermediate Maintenance
AVUM	Aviation Unit Maintenance
BDP	Base Development Plan
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CALM	Computer Aided Load Manifesting
CI	Counterintelligence
CIL	Critical Items List
CILDSS	Critical Items List Decision Support System
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CITES	Critical Items Tracking and Evaluation System
CLIC	(U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force) Center for Low Intensity Conflict
COASTLOC	Coastal Lines of Communication
COC	Combat Operations Center
CONUS	Continental United States
COSCOM	Corps Support Command
CP	Command Post
CPC	Combined Planning Commission
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTA	Common Table of Allowances
DAAS	Defense Automatic Addressing System
DCINC	Deputy Commander-in-Chief
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency

DISCOM	Division Support Command
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAAC	Department of Defense Activity Address Code
DODAAF	Department of Defense Activity Address File
DODIC	Department of Defense Identification Code
DS	Direct Support
DSS	Direct Support System
EAD	Echelons Above Division
EMCON	Emergency Condition
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FC	Field Circular
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
FMFLANT	Fleet Marine Force Atlantic
FO	Flag Officer
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
FWD	Forward
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Five Year Defense Plan
GO	General Officer
GRREG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
HELO	Helicopter
HMMWV	High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
IOC	Interim Operational Concept
IDS	Intermediate Direct Support
IGS	Intermediate General Support
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
ISC	Intelligence-Security Center
J-4	Logistics Directorate
J-5	Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JLICP	Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project
JLTPB	Joint Logistic Techniques and Procedures Board
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JSOA	Joint Special Operations Agency
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
JTF	Joint Task Force
LAMS	Locally Available Materiel and Services
LANTCOM	(U.S.) Atlantic Command
LAPES	Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System
LAV	Light Armored Vehicle
LFSP	Landing Force Support Party
LF6F	Landing Force Sixth Fleet
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LOGSTAT	Logistics Status
LOTS	Logistics Over The Shore

LRU	Line Replaceable Unit
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MEMO	Mission Essential Maintenance Only
MESAR	Minimum Essential Security Assistance Requirement
MFO	Maltinational Force and Observers
MHE	Materiel Handling Equipment
MILGP	Military Group
MOS	Military Occupation Specialty
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ships
MRE	Meal, Ready-to-Eat
MSR	Main Supply Route
MTDA	Modification Table of Distribution and Allowances
MTOE	Modification Table of Organization and Equipment
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDU	National Defense University
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NSN	National Stock Number
OCIE	Organizational Clothing Items and Equipment
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPG	Operational Planning Group
OPLAN	Operation Plan
ORF	Operational Readiness Float
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	(U.S.) Pacific Command
PASOLS	Pacific Area Senior Officers Logistics Seminar
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PCO	Peacetime Contingency Operations
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PL	Public Law
PLL	Prescribed Load List
POL	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants
POLSTAB	Political Stability
POMCUS	Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PX	Post Exchange
RAF	Royal Air Force
RECON	Reconnaissance
REIN	Reinforced
RORO	Roll On/Roll Off
ROWPU	Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
SAILS	Standard Army Integrated Logistics System
SARSS	Standard Army Retail Supply System
SCAD	Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division
SCALP	Scenario-Determined Computer Assisted Logistic Planning
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense

SO	Special Operations
SOC	Special Operations Capable
SOC	Special Operations Command
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
SOCITF	Special Operations Command Implementation Task Force
SOC PAC	Special Operations Command Pacific
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSA	Supply Support Activity
SSSC	Self Service Supply Center
SUPPT	Supply Point
TAC	Transportation Account Code
TACCS	Tactical Army CSS Computer System
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite
TCA	Terrorism Counteraction
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TLOC	Tactical Logistics Operations Center
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC	United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRAP	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
UCP	Unified Command Plan
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USALOGC	U.S. Army Logistics Center
USASAALA	United States Army Security Assistance Agency, Latin America
USC	United States Code
USCINCPAC	United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific
USCINCSOC	United States Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command
USD	Under Secretary of Defense
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USREDCOM	United States Readiness Command
USSOC	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
WGSC	War Gaming and Simulation Center
WPU	Water Purification Unit

Appendix Q
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